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THE ESQUIRE CASE: A LOST FREE SPEECH LANDMARK
Samantha Barbas*
During the Second World War, one of the most highly publicized cases impli-
cating speech and press freedoms did not involve political dissent. It did not involve
opposition to the war, socialism, Communism, pacifism, anarchism, or any political
matter whatsoever. Instead, it involved pin-up girls and a popular men’s magazine.
The First Amendment cause célèbre of the first half of the 1940s was the Post Office
Department’s seemingly arbitrary denial of second-class mailing privileges to Esquire
magazine, on grounds that it did not “contribute to the public good.”1 Although re-
duced, second-class mailing rates had historically been granted to nearly all periodicals
irrespective of their content, Postmaster General Frank Walker—a conservative
moralist determined to eradicate so-called dirty magazines from the mails—creatively
interpreted the second-class mail privilege as a “badge of good conduct.” According
to Walker, whether a magazine received the second-class rate was contingent on
whether the magazine, in his view, contributed to the “public good.”2 To Walker,
Esquire magazine, with its sexy jokes and pin-ups, was up to no good. Given pro-
hibitively expensive first-class mailing rates, the loss of the second-class privilege
portended the effective death of the magazine, and was described, rightly, as a form
of censorship.3
The Postmaster General’s 1943 decision barring Esquire from second-class mails
led to a massive public protest.4 The outcry around Walker’s decision attested not
only to the popularity of Esquire, but an emergent free speech sensibility in the culture
of the time. Over the previous fifteen years, the American public had moved toward
greater tolerance of a variety of expression, and intolerance of heavy-handed govern-
ment attempts to quash speech on moral and political grounds.5 This stance marked
the reversal of decades of conservatism, in which much of the public had approved
government restraints on expression, restrictions that were routinely upheld by the
courts under prevailing free speech doctrines.6 The Great Depression era, with its
* Professor of Law, University of Buffalo School of Law. JD, Stanford Law School; PhD,
History, University of California, Berkeley. Research for this Article was conducted in the Na-
tional Archives, Washington, D.C.; the Thurman Arnold Papers, University of Wyoming; the
American Civil Liberties Union Papers, Princeton University, and at the Library of Congress.
1 Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 149–50 (1946).
2 See id. at 149.
3 See id. at 151 n.7.
4 See discussion infra Part VI.
5 See discussion infra Section VI.C.
6 See discussion infra Section II.B.
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economic turmoil and social unrest, ushered in a new spirit of openness toward al-
ternative views and the marketplace of ideas.7 Spurred by liberal First Amendment
decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1930s, freedom of speech ascended to the
position of a cherished liberty, the symbol of American pluralism and democracy.8
In the wartime context, the Postmaster General’s edict against Esquire seemed es-
pecially egregious. Fighting to end dictatorship overseas, Americans confronted what
appeared to be tyranny on their own soil.
The “Esquire Affair” reflected the public’s nascent commitment to a more robust
view of free expression, and its growing opposition to censorship and authoritarian
controls over speech, beliefs, and morals. It marked an important moment in the social
history of free speech, and a legal milestone as well. After Walker’s denial of the
second-class privilege was upheld by a federal district court in Washington, D.C.,9 it
was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,10 and the reversal was affirmed in a
unanimous 1946 Supreme Court decision, Hannegan v. Esquire,11 in which the Court
placed free speech limitations on the nearly unfettered power of the Post Office De-
partment to restrict and censor the mail.12
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hannegan v. Esquire was also notable in that
it signaled the beginning of the expansion of the First Amendment beyond its tra-
ditional domains of political and religious speech. With its oft-cited dicta praising
the “uncensored distribution of literature”—“what seems to one to be trash may have
for others fleeting or even enduring values” . . . “[f]rom the multitude of competing
offerings the public [must] pick and choose”13—the Court in Esquire both reaf-
firmed and extended the free speech principles it had articulated in recent cases
involving political and religious expression.14 Major First Amendment cases of the
late 1930s and early 1940s had protected the rights of labor protesters, political dis-
sidents, and religious minorities to express their contrarian views.15 Participatory
democracy, the Court opined, depended on the free and candid exchange of a diversity
of perspectives on the public issues of the day.16 The application of these free speech
principles to a pin-up magazine represented a significant leap. With the Esquire
decision, the Court took freedom of speech beyond the lofty realms of political
7 See discussion infra Section III.A.
8 See discussion infra Section III.B.
9 Esquire, Inc., v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015 (D.D.C. 1944).
10 Esquire, Inc., v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
11 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
12 See Hannegan, 327 U.S. 158–59. The Post Office Department was the predecessor to the
U.S. Postal Service. The U.S. Postal Service began operations when the Postmaster General
was removed as a cabinet-level position. The United States Postal Service: An American His-
tory 1775–2006, USPS (May 2007), https://about.usps.com/publications/pub100.pdf.
13 Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 158.
14 See id.; see also infra note 614.
15 See discussion infra Section VI.C.
16 See discussion infra Section VI.C.
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commitment and religious faith to the decidedly more pedestrian terrain of popular
entertainment and culture.
This Article tells the story of the Esquire case, a critical and largely under-
recognized case that shaped both the law and culture of freedom of expression in the
mid-twentieth-century United States.17 In its articulation of the perils of government
censorship and top-down control over thought and expression—not only political
expression, but literature, entertainment, and culture—Hannegan v. Esquire repre-
sents one of the building blocks of the modern civil libertarian free speech canon.
Born of the World War II era, a time of heightened popular and judicial sensitivity
to civil liberties, the Esquire case registered a commitment on the Supreme Court,
and among the public more broadly, to freedom of choice in the expression and con-
sumption of ideas, and it contributed to the demise of film and literary censorship
after the war.18 Often overshadowed by other important free speech cases of the time,
the Esquire case deserves a prominent place in the history of the First Amendment
and the public’s relationship to freedom of expression.
The Postmaster General’s crackdown on Esquire grew from a longstanding cam-
paign against allegedly immoral magazines led by a Catholic reform group called the
National Organization for Decency in Literature (NODL).19 As Part I describes, in
1941 Postmaster General Frank Walker, a devout Catholic, pledged to assist the
NODL by eliminating indecent material from the mails. This was not hard to do,
since there were practically no constitutional limitations on the Postmaster General’s
authority. As explained in Part II, Supreme Court rulings between the 1880s and 1920s
had rendered the Post Office Department a largely First Amendment–free zone. By
the 1930s, however, as Part III illustrates, these rulings had become out of step with
the Supreme Court’s more speech-protective First Amendment doctrines, as well as
more liberal public attitudes toward freedom of speech.
In 1942, Walker launched his “decency campaign” by revoking the second-class
mailing privileges of several dozen magazines, mostly pulp and “girlie” magazines,
as told in Part IV. The campaign gained national attention when Walker turned his
wrath against Esquire, described in Part V. Esquire had earned acclaim for its “pin-
up girls,” popular among GIs overseas and widely regarded as a symbol of the
17 The case has been almost entirely overlooked in legal and historical scholarship. For an
extensive account of the case, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., 1 GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMU-
NICATIONS 276–368 (1947) [hereinafter CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS].
See also Jean Preer, Esquire v. Walker: The Postmaster General and “The Magazine for Men,”
23 PROLOGUE MAG. 7 (1990); Nate Sullivan, The “Varga Girl” Trials: The Struggle between
Esquire Magazine and the U.S. Post Office, and the Appropriation of the Pin-Up As a Cultural
Symbol (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska) (available online
at PQDT Open). The records of the Post Office Department hearing are held at the National
Archives in Washington, D.C.
18 See discussion infra Section VIII.E.
19 See discussion infra Section I.B.
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American home front. Walker declared Esquire too risqué for public consumption
and cut off its second-class mailing privileges. Not only did Walker punish Esquire,
but claimed authority under an 1879 postal statute to deny second-class mailing
privileges to any publication that did not, in his opinion, “contribute to the public
good.”20 The arbitrary decision against a respected, widely circulated magazine—not
to mention the chilling implications of Walker’s edict for the entire press—produced
a public outcry. Esquire, assisted by the American Civil Liberties Union, appealed the
decision, described in Parts V and VI. For two years, as the case wound its way through
the federal courts, the public watched intently, wondering whether the autocratic lead-
ership they were fighting to defeat abroad would be tolerated in their own country.
In the 1946 decision in Hannegan v. Esquire, the Supreme Court overruled the
ban, restored Esquire’s mailing privileges, negated Walker’s interpretation of the
postal statute, and averted what could have been a disaster for the press.21 As Part
VIII explains, Esquire was a victory for free expression on many levels. The opinion
by Justice William Douglas channeled the pro-speech, anti-censorship sentiments
held by much of the public, linked free expression and freedom of choice to democ-
racy and the nation’s war efforts, and extended freedom of speech into new terrain.
With its assertion that “a requirement that literature or art conform to some norm
prescribed by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our system,”22 the Esquire
decision registered an eloquent commitment to emerging, civil libertarian ideals and
pointed toward a new direction in free speech history.
I. THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST INDECENT LITERATURE
A. The Morals Crusade
The story of the Esquire case is part of the long history of “morals censorship”
in the United States—restrictions on speech, especially literature and popular enter-
tainment, for its supposedly immoral content. Beginning in the late nineteenth century,
church groups, women’s groups, and other social reform organizations—many af-
filiated with Protestant churches—had mobilized to censor or eradicate purportedly
indecent art, culture, and entertainment.23 Pulp novels, motion pictures, popular music,
and books and magazines featuring themes of sex and violence allegedly tainted the
nation’s moral fabric, corrupted youth, and led to crime, debauchery, and sin.24
20 See generally Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 150 (1946) (reproducing the Post-
master General’s own words).
21 See generally id.
22 Id. at 158.
23 See infra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
24 See NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY RE-
PRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA (1997); ANDREA FRIEDMAN, PRURIENT INTERESTS:
GENDER, DEMOCRACY, AND OBSCENITY IN NEW YORK CITY, 1909–1945 (2000); MARJORIE
HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: “INDECENCY,” CENSORSHIP, AND THE INNOCENCE OF
2018] THE ESQUIRE CASE: A LOST FREE SPEECH LANDMARK 291
National reform groups such as the Ward and Watch Society, along with hundreds
of smaller, local organizations, pressured authorities to pass laws banning “dirty”
books, films, and magazines, and to prosecute the makers and sellers of such material
under obscenity and indecency laws.25 They called to strengthen obscenity laws, and
in some states were behind the passage of laws criminalizing violent literature de-
scribing “bloodshed, lust, and crime.”26 Between 1900 and 1915, reform organiza-
tions spurred the passage of film censorship laws that required filmmakers and theater
owners to go before government boards to approve movie content before exhibition.27
These restrictions did not offend prevailing free speech doctrines, either under the
First Amendment or similar state constitutional provisions. The government had
broad authority to suppress speech that had a “bad tendency”28—that which had the
possibility of harming the public’s welfare, however remote or slight the potential
harm.29 Such authority was said to be a legitimate exercise of the state’s police
powers to undertake state action on behalf of public safety, health, and morals.30
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the work of the cultural
reformers resonated broadly with the conservative moral views held by much of the
middle-class populace.31 During the 1920s, however, the censors’ aims and perspec-
tives began to diverge more substantially from the mainstream.32 In the more free-
wheeling, cosmopolitan social milieu of the 1920s—an age of cultural liberalization
marked by urbanization, the rise of consumer culture, the declining influence of reli-
gion, and more permissive attitudes toward sex—Victorian-era proprieties began to
seem outmoded, especially to young, urban members of society, and reformers were
mocked as bluenoses and prudes.33 Freedom of thought and expression assumed new
YOUTH (2007); LEIGH ANN WHEELER, AGAINST OBSCENITY: REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF
WOMANHOOD IN AMERICA, 1873–1935 (2004); Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge
to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society—From Anthony
Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 741 (1992).
25 See PAUL S. BOYER, PURITY IN PRINT: THE VICE-SOCIETY MOVEMENT AND BOOK CEN-
SORSHIP IN AMERICA 1–22 (1968).
26 See, e.g., State v. McKee, 46 A. 409, 410 (Conn. 1900) (noting that McKee was convicted
under such a law for selling a newspaper containing stories of “bloodshed, lust and crime”).
27 See Samantha Barbas, How the Movies Became Speech, 64 RUTGERS L. REV. 665,
672–78 (2012) (detailing the origins of movie censorship).
28 DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 132 (1997).
29 Id. at 132–46.
30 See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 572–74
(1868); ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER: PUBLIC POLICY AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
3–7 (1904); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the
Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 11–13 (2000).
31 See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text.
32 See Blanchard, supra note 24, at 768–81 (detailing the change in censorship following
World War I).
33 See, e.g., id. at 770–71 (noting that the Boston branch of the Watch and Ward Society
“became a national laughingstock” for its censorship practices).
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importance, and efforts to censor literature were met with greater resistance.34 With
the cultural zeitgeist turning against them, the reformers found that their crusade to
purge society of so-called “dangerous” media had become more challenging. With
movie censorship well-established in the states, and book censorship becoming dis-
favored, the reformers focused on what they saw as a new, pernicious social menace:
pulp magazines.
B. The Pulps
The late 1920s and early 1930s saw the proliferation of cheap magazines. De-
creases in the cost of paper and printing led to a staggering increase in the volume
of so-called “pulp” publications.35 With their bright covers, titillating illustrations,
bold headlines and lurid teasers, the “pulps”—with titles like Spy Stories, Love Story,
Saucy, Spicy Mystery, and New York Nights—appealed to a Depression-era populace
hungry for inexpensive, escapist entertainment.36 Many of the pulps were fiction-
oriented, offering romance, detective, adventure, and true confession stories.37 Some
focused on horror stories or the escapades of cowboys and gangsters.38 “Girlie
magazines” were an especially popular genre, featuring illustrations of scantily clad
women.39 Most of the pulps had strong overtones of sex; they were highly sugges-
tive, and some bordered on the pornographic.40
The pulps were wildly popular. In 1935, according to one source, 125 pulp maga-
zine publishers shipped out 2,000 carloads of magazines each month.41 One reform
organization alleged that 365 pulps had come into being since the beginning of the
Great Depression in 1929.42 In March 1939, a pastor of one Iowa town alleged that
“off-color” magazines had an estimated 60 million readers.43 “A torrent of smutty
34 See id. at 771–81 (explaining the fierce debate in the Senate on Bronson Cutting’s (Repub-
lican from New Mexico) proposal to rid the tariff bill of its political and obscenity exclusions).
35 See THEODORE PETERSON, MAGAZINES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 49–51 (1956);
Pulp Illustration: Pulp Magazines, NORMAN ROCKWELL MUSEUM, https://www.illustration
history.org/genres/pulp-illustration-pulp-magazines [http://perma.cc/5X9N-HPQJ] (last visited
Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Pulp Illustration].
36 See Pulp Illustration, supra note 35.
37 PETERSON, supra note 35, at 308. The major categories of pulp magazine publishing in
the 1930s, according to magazine historian Theodore Peterson, were “adventure, love, detec-
tive, and Western.” Id.
38 See Una M. Cadegan, Guardians of Democracy or Cultural Storm Troopers? American
Catholics and the Control of Popular Media, 1934–1966, 87 CATH. HIST. REV. 252, 258 (2001)
[hereinafter Cadegan, Guardians of Democracy].
39 See id. (“‘Girlie’ magazines displayed suggestive photographs and cartoons.”).
40 For an in-depth analysis of the different genres of pulp magazines, see TONY GOODSTONE,
THE PULPS: FIFTY YEARS OF AMERICAN POP CULTURE (1976).
41 PETERSON, supra note 35, at 309.
42 Wants Decent Magazines, MASON CITY GLOBE-GAZETTE (Utah), Mar. 15, 1939, at 13.
43 Id.
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magazines is flowing across the news stands of the nation,” warned one author.44 “In
the past decade the growth of salacious literature has been the most rapid in history.”45
Law enforcement officials linked the pulps to an increase in crime.46 FBI director
J. Edgar Hoover declared that “the circulation of periodicals containing salacious
material” played “an important part” in the formation of juvenile delinquents.47 Re-
formers described the pulps as a moral cancer spreading insidiously through com-
munities; “their contents [were] revolting slime, nauseating to the normal adult but
dangerously appealing to weak or impressionable mentalities.”48
In 1938, Catholic bishops founded The National Organization for Decent Litera-
ture (NODL) to deal specifically with the problem of the pulps.49 This was not the
Catholic community’s first large-scale attempt to reform popular culture. In 1933,
Catholics devoted to eradicating “indecency” from motion pictures had organized
the Legion of Decency, an activist group that would go on to exert major influence
over the content of Hollywood films.50 Bishop John F. Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana,
who headed the NODL, believed that the traffic in pulp magazines was “an evil of
such magnitude as seriously to threaten the moral, social and national life of our
country.”51 He saw “diabolical intent” on the part of magazine publishers “to weaken
morality and thereby destroy religion and subvert the social order.”52 Noll believed
that it was the Catholic Church’s duty “to organize and set in motion the moral forces
of the entire country” to protect Americans, especially the young, from the menace
of immoral magazines.53
Under Noll’s leadership, the NODL planned a systematic national campaign, to
be executed in all American dioceses, against the publication, distribution, and sale
of “salacious literature.”54 One of the NODL’s first tasks was the creation of a list of
publications disapproved by the organization, which would be determined by a moral
44 Editorial, Salacious Literature, AIKEN STANDARD & REV. (South Carolina), Feb. 14,
1940, at 4.
45 Don Packard, Sex Crimes Increase, MORNING CALL (Pennsylvania), May 20, 1940, at 6.
46 Sex Magazines and Sex Crimes, OREM-GENEVA TIMES (Utah), Oct. 17, 1957, at 2.
47 Id.
48 Courtney Ryley Cooper, This Trash Must Go! 36 READER’S DIG. 20, 21 (1940).
49 Thomas F. O’Connor, The National Organization for Decent Literature: A Phase in
American Catholic Censorship, 65 LIB. Q. 386, 390 (1995) (explaining the origins of the
foundation and its purpose). See also UNA M. CADEGAN, ALL GOOD BOOKS ARE CATHOLIC
BOOKS: PRINT CULTURE, CENSORSHIP, AND MODERNITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(2013) (discussing the Catholic literary culture).
50 RUTH A. INGLIS, FREEDOM OF THE MOVIES: A REPORT ON SELF REGULATION FROM THE
COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 120–21 (1974).
51 O’Connor, supra note 49, at 390. On Bishop Noll and the NODL’s crusade against in-
decency, see Cadegan, Guardians of Democracy, supra note 38.
52 O’Connor, supra note 49, at 390.
53 Catholics Start Drive to Curb Obscenity, COURIER-J. (Kentucky), Feb. 12, 1939, at 15
(quoting Noll describing the committee’s campaign).
54 Id. at 15.
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code.55 The NODL code identified indecent literature as that which “1-glorifie[d] crime
and the criminal; 2-[was] predominantly ‘sexy’; 3-feature[d] illicit love; 4-contain[ed]
indecent or objectionable pictures; and 5-carrie[d] disreputable advertis[ing].”56 Priests
and laymen, coordinated by Noll’s assistant in Washington, D.C., reviewed hundreds
of magazines against the code.57 The list of objectionable publications was printed in
the official organ for the NODL, the Acolyte.58 NODL members pressured news-
stands and bookstores to remove magazines on the list, on the threat of boycotts or
prosecutions for obscenity.59 The group denied that it was pursuing censorship,
claiming that it was merely supplementing the work of the police and other organi-
zations that prosecuted actionable materials.60
Though the NODL was widely criticized for its repressive tactics and intolerant
views, the organization struck a chord among many conservative Catholics, particu-
larly in the Midwest.61 By 1940, the group had the cooperation of one hundred dio-
ceses.62 Forty thousand Catholics in Binghamton, New York, offered their support.63
In Detroit, within a month of the NODL’s founding, thousands of Catholics boycotted
newsstands and bookstores that sold “objectionable” reading matter.64 Throughout
the country, volunteers armed with the NODL list canvassed newsstands, pharma-
cies, and other stores selling pulp magazines.65 Some of the local NODL groups
offered certificates of approval that cooperative newsdealers could display: “We are
cooperating with the National Organization for Decent Literature.”66
According to the NODL, within its first two years it had cut the number of “dis-
gusting publications” in the country from 175 to 45.67 It allegedly forced at least thirty
publications out of business and compelled others to clean up.68 In one city, NODL
55 See Cadegan, Guardians of Democracy, supra note 38, at 258.
56 Id. at 258–59.
57 O’Connor, supra note 49, at 395.
58 See JOHN F. NOLL, MANUAL OF THE NODL 10 (n.d.).
59 O’Connor, supra note 49, at 396.
60 See A Council for Decency in Magazines, 147 CATH. WORLD 494, 494 (1938).
61 O’Connor, supra note 49, at 390, 393 (noting that NODL formed and opened their na-
tional office in Chicago).
62 Alvin W. Forney, For Decent Literature, PITT. PRESS, Mar. 23, 1940, at 4.
63 Council to Get Bill Calling for Cooperation, BINGHAMTON PRESS (New York), Mar. 28,
1939, at 5.
64 Church Starts Book Boycott, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 25, 1939, at 8. At masses, the
laity were asked to pledge, “I promise to refrain from purchasing and reading all reading matter
which violates” the NODL code, and “I promise not to enter places where such literature con-
tinues to be sold.” Id.
65 See, e.g., Diocese Catholics Start Drive Against Indecent Literature, BINGHAMTON PRESS
(New York), Mar. 7, 1939, at 5.
66 A.D., Letter to the Editor, Time to Keep Morals on High Plane Here, RACINE J. TIMES
(Wisconsin), Dec. 29, 1950, at 12.
67 Times Herald Column Printed in State Catholic Publication, PORT HURON TIMES
HERALD (Michigan), May 21, 1941, at 5.
68 Id.
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members persuaded thirty-seven drugstores and newsstands that it was better to forego
sales and remove offending magazines than incur the wrath of the organization.69
Public officials representing conservative or religious constituencies often lent
their assistance to the NODL. One NODL-affiliated priest in Albany, New York
convinced the local district attorney to put pressure on magazine distributors.70 By
1940, the power of the NODL was so great in the Midwest and parts of the east that
several cities officially banned magazines on the list.71 A prosecutor in Indiana sent
the NODL list to magazine distributors with the warning: “[I shall] view [as] crimi-
nally unlawful the possession and sale of . . . any publication listed as disapproved
by this Decent Literature organization and I shall prosecute accordingly.”72 New
York’s Catholic Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia threatened to order city garbage trucks
to remove forty-two magazines on the NODL list from newsstands and trash them.73
LaGuardia also threatened newsdealers with the loss of their licenses if they contin-
ued to sell “objectionable” magazines.74 Mayors in Philadelphia, St. Louis, Detroit,
Cleveland, and Chicago took similar actions.75
Magazine publishers worried about the NODL’s threat to their livelihood, and
civil libertarians were concerned with the organization’s threat to publishing freedom.
In May 1941, the chief executive of a major magazine distributor wrote to Roger
Baldwin, head of the ACLU.76 “They are getting wider and wider publicity and wider
and wider power, threatening retailers and wholesalers . . . and absolutely nothing has
been done to combat this autocratic censorship,” he wrote.77 The organization “seems
to be getting more active,” wrote Raymond Smith, a news dealer from Port Huron,
Michigan, to his distributor.78 According to Smith, there were thirty-seven church
members in Port Huron who “make the rounds” among newsstands weekly.79 They
posted cards “in the vestibules of . . . churches with the name of every store handling
allegedly [objectionable] magazines,” and were successful in convincing many news
dealers to keep those publications off newsstands.80 “From their standpoint, they
69 Id.
70 Stepped-Up Drive Mapped by Literature Organization, ELMIRA ADVERTISER (New
York), Jan. 31, 1958, at 11.
71 See infra notes 72–82 and accompanying text.
72 Drive on Magazines to Start Wednesday, TIMES (Indiana), Aug. 13, 1944, at 13.
73 See LaGuardia Asks Newsdealers War on Indecent Magazines, BROOK. DAILY EAGLE
(New York), July 11, 1940, at 26.
74 See id.; Get Rid of Dirty Magazines or I’ll Do It As Disposal of Sewage, DAILY NOTES
(Pennsylvania), July 24, 1940, at 4.
75 NOLL, supra note 58, at 108, 112.
76 Letter from Hunter Leaf to Roger Baldwin (May 1, 1941), in 2436 ACLU PAPERS,
11–12, Princeton University (microfilm, University of Washington).
77 Id.
78 Letter from Raymond C. Smith to Hunter Leaf (May 17, 1941), in 2436 ACLU PAPERS,
18–19, Princeton University (microfilm, University of Washington).
79 Id.
80 Id.
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really have accomplished something in this district and with the callers for NODL
threatening boycotting this particular store you can see how difficult it is to persuade
the merchant to have anything to do with those they are asked not to place on their
stands,” Smith wrote.81 By mid-1941, the organization had persuaded all but two
newsdealers in Port Huron, Michigan, to ban the magazines on its list.82
C. The NODL and the Post Office Department
In 1940, Bishop Noll made a shrewd and strategic move when he contacted the
United States Post Office Department, hoping to enlist its cooperation in the cam-
paign. The Post Office Department had long been a friend of the “decency crusaders”;
in the 1860s, Congress had granted the Department broad statutory authority to ban
obscene publications from the mail.83 There was no clear definition of obscenity in
the anti-obscenity law, and the determination of whether a publication was obscene
was largely a matter of the Postmaster General’s discretion.84 The Post Office Depart-
ment used its power to ban purportedly obscene material frequently and arbitrarily.
Under the Department’s interpretation of an 1879 statute, it also had the authority
to deny reduced, second-class mailing rates to obscene publications.85 The denial of
second-class mailing privileges was used less frequently than the outright ban; it was
more effective to deny publications access to the mail than to inflict the lesser, but
nonetheless serious penalty of cutting off reduced mailing rates.
Noll wrote to then–Postmaster General James Farley, alerting him to the NODL
campaign and asking that the “Department do all in its power to make it more
difficult for publishers who outrage decency to procure the second class mail privi-
lege.”86 The chief lawyer of the Post Office Department assured Noll that the Post-
master General “desires to cooperate with your Committee in every way possible
under the existing law to make your most worthy campaign a success.”87 Later that
year, Farley resigned and President Roosevelt appointed Frank Walker—an influen-
tial Roman Catholic, prominent in Catholic charity work—to head the Post Office
Department.88 Noll found a willing partner in this devout and morally conservative
new Postmaster General.89
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 89, 13 Stat. 504, 507.
84 See JAMES C. N. PAUL & MURRAY L. SCHWARTZ, FEDERAL CENSORSHIP: OBSCENITY IN
THE MAIL 71 (1961).
85 See discussion infra Section II.B.
86 NOLL, supra note 58, at 59–60.
87 Id. at 62.
88 FRANK C. WALKER & ROBERT H. FERRELL, FDR’S QUIET CONFIDANT: THE AUTOBI-
OGRAPHY OF FRANK C. WALKER 134 (1997). See also Timothy Walch, Walker, Frank
Comerford, in 22 AMERICAN NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 494, 494 (John A. Garraty & Mark C.
Carnes eds., 1999).
89 See id.
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Walker was one of Roosevelt’s most trusted advisors, and one of the wealthiest
men connected with the New Deal.90 The son of a miner, Walker had grown up in
poverty in Butte, Montana, at the turn of the century.91 Walker received a law degree
from Notre Dame in 1909 and returned to practice law in Montana.92 In 1925, Walker
moved to New York to become manager and general counsel of a chain of movie
theaters owned by his uncle.93 Within two decades, Walker had moved from his
working-class roots to the upper echelons of corporate leadership.94
Walker contributed generously to Roosevelt’s gubernatorial and presidential
campaigns.95 When Roosevelt took office in 1932, Walker was named executive
secretary of the President’s Council, a group that acted as a contact point between
the cabinet and newly created recovery agencies.96 Nine months later, he was made
head of the National Emergency Council.97 Dissatisfied with his work in government,
he returned to the theater business in 1934.98 After raising funds for the Democrats
for the 1936 election and becoming part of an inner circle that shaped strategy for
Roosevelt’s 1940 third-term campaign, Walker was appointed Postmaster General in
August 1940.99 The Postmaster General was traditionally the political representative
of the party in power, and simultaneously chairman of the National Committee.100
In 1942, at Bishop Noll’s urging, Walker began a “decency campaign” in the Post Of-
fice Department, denying second-class mailing rates to dozens of allegedly obscene
and “immoral” publications on the NODL’s list, including Esquire magazine.101
II. THE POSTAL POWER TO CENSOR
The authority of Congress and the Post Office Department over the circulation of
the mails was virtually unfettered. Under the power granted in Article 1, Section 8 of
the Constitution, and Supreme Court interpretations of the postal power, Congress had
expansive, police-power-like authority to determine what could be sent through the
mails,102 and the Post Office Department had broad discretion to execute statutory
90 See Walch, supra note 88, at 494.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 See id.
95 See id. (noting Walker contributed “tens of thousands of dollars” to Roosevelt’s presi-
dential campaign).
96 Id.
97 See id.
98 See WALKER & FERRELL, supra note 88, at 92.
99 See Walch, supra note 88, at 494.
100 KATHARINE GRAHAM, KATHARINE GRAHAM’S WASHINGTON 216 (2002).
101 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
102 See Schiller, supra note 30, at 39 (“The scope of the police power defined the constitu-
tional limits of Congress’s power regardless of the First Amendment. So long as Congress’s
298 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:287
restrictions on the mails.103 In several cases between 1880 and 1910, the Supreme Court
declared that the Postmaster General’s decisions to bar materials from the mails were
to be reviewed under deferential administrative law standards and could be overturned
only if they were arbitrary and capricious or “clearly wrong,” even if based on the con-
tent of speech.104 In this domain, the First Amendment had virtually no application.
A. The Mail and the First Amendment
Other than regulating the weight and size of mailable matter, Congress did not
impose limitations on the use of the mails until the post–Civil War period.105 In the
1860s and 1870s, it enacted a series of statutes criminalizing the mailing of certain
types of material deemed dangerous to the public, including fight films, advertise-
ments for lotteries, and obscene matter.106 The prohibition on obscene matter dates
back to 1873 and the infamous Comstock Law, named after Anthony Comstock, the
notorious anti-vice reformer who was a major force behind its passage.107 The law
declared every “obscene, lewd, or lascivious book, pamphlet, picture, paper, print,
or other publication of an indecent character” to be nonmailable.108 Mailing obscene
material was punishable by fines and imprisonment.109
While the original wording of the Comstock Law was penal,110 the Post Office
Department inferred from it independent civil authority to restrain the mailing of
obscene matter. By the 1890s, the practice of banning obscene publications from the
mails was well-established.111 The reigning definition of obscenity used in the courts,
and by the Post Office Department, came from the 1868 English decision in Regina
v. Hicklin.112 Whether or not material was obscene was judged by its effects on
children—“whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave
goal was to exclude materials that would be injurious to public morals, the Court would find
the exclusion constitutional.”).
103 See J. EDWARD GERALD, THE PRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1931–1947 129 (1948)
(“The postmaster general, in the course of nearly seventy years of encouragement from the
courts and Congress, had created an administrative tradition of great power, which could easily
decide the financial fate of any publication making heavy use of the mails.”).
104 See, e.g., Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497, 509 (1904) (noting that the
Postmaster General has broad authority to remove materials from the mails provided such
action is not undertaken in a “palpably wrong” manner).
105 Comment, The Esquire Case—A Novel Extension of the Postmaster-General’s Powers
of Classifying Mail, 53 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1944).
106 Eberhard P. Deutsch, Freedom of the Press and of the Mails, 36 MICH. L. REV. 703,
726–27 (1938).
107 See Patrick J. Kelly, Victorian Vice, 26 REV. AM. HIST. 717, 717 (1998) (reviewing
BEISEL, supra note 24).
108 Act of Mar. 3, 1873, ch. 258, 17 Stat. 598, 599.
109 Id.
110 See id.
111 See PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 84, at 34.
112 [1868] 3 LRQB 360, 371 (Eng.).
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and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall.”113 Postal officials determined whether
material was obscene based on a cursory visual inspection of the material.114
When these statutory limitations on the mail began to be tested in the courts on
First Amendment grounds, they were universally sustained on the rationale that
Congress had broad authority to “refuse facilities for the distribution of matter
deemed injurious to the public morals.”115 In Ex parte Jackson,116 the Supreme Court
upheld, against First Amendment challenge, a conviction under the statute penaliz-
ing mailing lottery advertising.117 The use of the mails, the Court declared, was a
privilege that Congress could grant or withhold under any conditions it pleased.118
Although the holding was directed at the lottery exclusion, the “privilege doctrine”
“expanded to cover all regulations of the Post Office Department by Congress.”119
The Postmaster General was charged with determining whether publications fell
into one of the statutory proscriptions and barring them accordingly.120 The courts re-
viewed the Postmaster General’s decisions deferentially, even though the exclusions
were almost always content-based. In Public Clearing House v. Coyne,121 the Supreme
Court articulated highly permissive standards for judicial review of the Postmaster
General’s decisions.122 Persons who thought they were wronged by the actions of the
Postmaster General could obtain redress from the courts only if the Postmaster
General had been “palpably wrong.”123 A handbook on Administrative Procedures
in Government Agencies issued by the Department of Justice in 1940 summarized
the nearly unbounded discretion of the Post Office Department to censor the mails:
The peculiar nature of the postal service as a Federal enterprise in-
tended for the convenience of the public, and to produce revenues,
has made this a fertile field for Federal supervision, apparently
unencumbered by such constitutional restraints as freedom of
speech or of the press . . . . Congress has a proprietary interest in
113 Id.
114 Patricia Robertus, Obscenity in the Mails: Controls on Second-Class Privileges 1942–1957
at 6 (Aug. 1974) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington) (available at
eric.ed.gov).
115 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877).
116 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
117 Id. at 737.
118 See id. at 736.
119 Theodore Kadin, Administrative Censorship: A Study of the Mails, Motion Pictures,
and Radio Broadcasting, 19 B.U. L. REV. 533, 541 (1939). See also Deutsch, supra note 106,
at 740 (“So well entrenched by this time had become the principle that the use of mails is a
privilege to which Congress may attach practically any conditions it sees fit. . . .”).
120 See Kadin, supra note 119, at 548.
121 194 U.S. 497 (1904).
122 See id. at 509.
123 Id.
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the postal service; use of the mails, accordingly, is a privilege
which can be withheld, and not a constitutional right . . . . Not only
are constitutional restraints inapplicable, but judicial restraints
also are, for the most part, absent . . . . [S]ince the Postmaster
General is an executive officer vested with broad discretion . . .
courts have been singularly loath to interfere.124
B. The Second-Class Mails
In addition to excluding material from the mails, the Post Office Department had
another method of preventing the circulation of matter it deemed obscene or other-
wise nonmailable—the denial of second-class mailing privileges. Since the begin-
nings of the Postal Service, newspapers and periodicals had enjoyed low mailing
rates,125 essentially a government subsidy to promote the wide dissemination of
knowledge to the public. In 1792, educational and informational matter, including
newspapers, was granted a rate about one-sixth that of letter postage.126 Mailable
matter was divided into three classes: letters in the first-class, printed periodicals in
the second-class, and miscellaneous articles in the third-class.127 For the vast major-
ity of periodicals, dependent on subscription revenue, second-class rates were es-
sential to survival—they were “basic to a free press.”128
There were two ways the Post Office Department could deny a publication
second-class mailing rates.129 One was to claim that it was nonmailable for obscenity
or another violation of a federal postal statute, and deny it second-class privileges on
that basis, as will be discussed in the next section.130 Another way was to deem a publi-
cation noncompliant with the Classification Act.131 The Classification Act, passed in
1879, imposed four conditions for the admission of mailable periodicals to the second-
class rate.132 The first and second conditions required, respectively, that a periodical
“must regularly be [published] at stated intervals,” must “be numbered consecutively,”
and “must be issued from a known office.”133 The third condition stated that the peri-
odical must consist of “printed paper sheets, without board, cloth, leather, or other
substantial binding,” which distinguished it from a book.134 Under the fourth condition,
124 Administrative Procedure In Government Agencies, Monograph of The Attorney Gen-
eral’s Committee on Administrative Procedure, S. Doc. No. 186, at 2 (3d Sess. 1940).
125 Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 232, 238.
126 See id. at 235, 238 (noting that the mailing rate for letters was $0.06 to $0.25).
127 Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 7, 17 Stat. 283, 358.
128 Kadin, supra note 119, at 538; GERALD, supra note 103, at 132 (“[T]he power of life
or death to many publications.”).
129 See infra notes 130–44 and accompanying text.
130 See discussion infra Section II.C.
131 Postal Classification Act of 1879, ch. 180, 20 Stat. 355.
132 Id. at 359.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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the publication “must be originated and published for the dissemination of informa-
tion of a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some special
industry, and having a legitimate list of subscribers . . . .”135 The publication, in other
words, had to be a true periodical rather than an advertising circular; Congress included
the fourth condition to address the problem of advertising sheets, in the guise of
magazines, seeking reduced mailing rates.136 In 1913, the Supreme Court declared
that the power to deny or revoke second-class mailing rates to publications that did
not meet the statutory requirements of the Classification Act did not violate the First
Amendment.137 Reduced mailing rates were said to be a “great and exclusive privi-
lege” that could be granted or denied at the Post Office Department’s discretion.138
C. The Milwaukee Leader Case
The immediate post–World War I era saw the first major challenges to the Post-
master General’s authority to restrict the second-class mails. During the war, the federal
government and the states had moved to quash dissent by criminalizing allegedly radi-
cal, subversive, or disloyal expression.139 Members of the Industrial Workers of the
World (IWW), socialists, conscientious objectors, and other dissenting groups were
prosecuted under broad, hastily enacted sedition laws.140 In 1917, Congress passed the
Espionage Act,141 which made it a felony to cause or attempt to cause “insubordination,
disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military . . . forces, or . . . [to] obstruct . . .
recruiting or enlistment into the armed services.142 Title XII made any matter in
violation of the Act nonmailable.143
Postmaster General Burleson used the Espionage Act to cut off the mailing privi-
leges of publications containing allegedly seditious matter.144 Not only did he exclude
from the mails single issues of publications containing anti-war propaganda,145 but he
also revoked the second-class mailing privileges of publications he deemed to be in vio-
lation of the Espionage Act,146 even though the Act did not explicitly authorize such
revocation.147 One of the publications that had its second-class privileges revoked
135 Id.
136 See PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 84, at 35.
137 See generally Lewis Publ’g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
138 Id. at 300.
139 See MARGARET A. BLANCHARD, REVOLUTIONARY SPARKS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
IN MODERN AMERICA 72 (1992).
140 See id.
141 Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
142 Id. at 219.
143 Id. at 230–31; United States ex rel. Milwaukee Soc. Democratic Publ’g Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407, 409 (1921).
144 Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 412.
145 See id.
146 Id. at 408–09.
147 See Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217; Burleson, 255 U.S. at 428–29 (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
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was the Milwaukee Leader, a socialist newspaper published by Victor Berger, founder
of the Socialist Party of America.148 According to Burleson, several issues of the Leader
contained editorials declaring the war “unjustifiable and dishonorable” and encour-
aged readers to resist the draft.149 Burleson deemed such material nonmailable and
revoked the second-class permit.150 Berger brought an action before the Supreme
Court to compel the restoration of the permit, declaring that the Postmaster Gen-
eral’s reading of the statute violated the First Amendment.151 The exclusion of future
issues of periodicals from second-class rates on the basis of past issues, Berger argued,
was a prior restraint—advance censorship of a publication—widely agreed to be
constitutionally suspect, even under the restrictive free speech doctrines of the time.152
The government contended that the Postmaster General’s conclusions were un-
reviewable and the First Amendment inapplicable.153 Use of the mails, including
reduced-rate mailing, was a privilege that could be withdrawn at will.154
Justice Clarke, writing for a majority, agreed with the government.155 The majority
based its decision on the purportedly privileged nature of the second-class mailing
rate and deference to the Postmaster General’s conclusions.156 The majority held that
since revocation did not exclude the paper from the mails nor preclude its reentry to
the second-class rate, its First Amendment rights were not infringed.157 The Postmaster
General’s conclusion that the Leader would likely violate the Espionage Act’s pro-
visions in the future, based on past issues, was not unjustified or clearly wrong.158 The
prior restraint nature of the revocation was justified by a bootstrap argument—an
issue violating the Espionage Act was nonmailable; since the periodical had missed
an issue, it was not “regularly issued” within the purview of the Classification Act
and therefore not entitled to second-class rates.159
Justice Louis Brandeis, who had recently dissented with Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes in Abrams v. United States,160 affirming an Espionage Act conviction under the
148 ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 247 (1967) [hereinafter
CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES].
149 Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 413.
150 Id. at 412.
151 See id. at 409 (“The grounds upon which the relator relies, are, in substance, that, to
the extent that the Espionage Act confers power upon the Postmaster General to make the
order entered against it, that act is unconstitutional, because . . . the order deprives relator of
the right of free speech, [and] is destructive of the rights of a free press . . . .”).
152 For an explanation of the prior restraint doctrine, see Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648 (1955).
153 Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 420 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 415 (majority opinion).
155 Id. at 416.
156 See id. at 408–16.
157 See id. at 416.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 425–26.
160 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
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newly formulated First Amendment “clear and present danger” test,161 issued a scathing
dissent.162 He saw in the issue of second-class mailing rates a critical question of free-
dom of the press: “what we decide may determine in large measure whether . . . our
press shall be free.”163 In denying publications the steeply reduced rates that made
large-scale circulation possible, the majority impeded “liberty of circulation”164:
If such power were possessed by the Postmaster General, he
would, in view of the practical finality of his decisions, become
the universal censor of publications. For a denial of the use of
the mail would be for most of them tantamount to a denial of the
right of circulation.165
Brandeis declared that there was nothing in the Espionage Act or its history that
granted the Postmaster General the power to revoke the second-class rates of non-
mailable publications.166 More broadly, Brandeis argued for the abolition of the privi-
lege doctrine.167 He rejected the government’s position that the use of the second-class
mails was a privilege that may “be granted or withheld at the pleasure of Congress.”168
Burleson’s actions constituted a prior restraint and should be invalidated on First
Amendment grounds.169 The Postmaster General’s revocation order, and the major-
ity’s deference to his asserted authority, “raise[d] not only a grave question, but a
‘succession of constitutional doubts’”.170
Like Brandeis, Justice Holmes, in his dissent, recognized the constitutional implica-
tions of the second-class permit denial.171 The use of the mails at reduced rates was al-
most “as much a part of free speech as the right to use our tongues . . . it would take
very strong language to convince me that Congress ever intended to give such a prac-
tically despotic power to any one man.”172 “To refuse the second-class rate to a newspa-
per [was] to make its circulation impossible.”173 What happened to the Leader “was
a serious attack upon liberties that not even the war induced Congress to infringe.”174
161 See id. at 624–31; see also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 334–43 (1920) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
162 Milwaukee Leader, 255 U.S. at 417–36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
163 Id. at 417.
164 Id. at 431.
165 Id. at 423.
166 Id. at 428–29.
167 See id. at 428.
168 Id. at 433.
169 See id. at 436.
170 Id. at 429.
171 See id. at 438 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
172 Id. at 437.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 438.
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Holmes agreed with Brandeis that the revocation constituted a prior restraint and
urged rejection of the privilege doctrine.175 Holmes and Brandeis had an influential
ally in Zechariah Chafee, the Harvard Law School professor whose writings on free
speech, including his treatise Freedom of Speech in Wartime,176 had greatly influ-
enced both Holmes and Brandeis.177 In an article in the Nation shortly after Milwau-
kee Leader, Chafee observed that “[n]o decision of the United States Supreme Court
has gone so far in sustaining governmental powers over the press. . . .”178
D. Inclusion and Exclusion
Despite the Supreme Court’s validation of the Post Office Department’s authority
to revoke the second-class privileges of nonmailable material, the Department rarely
exercised that power in the 1920s and 30s. Typically, it excluded single issues of
publications from the mails on grounds of sedition or fraud, or more commonly, for
obscenity.179 The Post Office Department continued to use the Hicklin standard,
judging works obscene based on their likely impact on children, even though federal
courts were adopting more permissive standards.180 In 1934, the federal district court
and the Circuit Court of Appeals in New York ruled in United States v. One Book
Called Ulysses181 that James Joyce’s work was not obscene because the book, taken
as a whole, “did not tend to excite sexual impulses or lustful thoughts” in the adult
with “average sex instincts.”182 In Parmelee v. United States,183 a federal district court
adopted a “community standards” test for obscenity, recognizing that obscenity was
an elusive moral concept that “[varies] in meaning from one period to another.”184
What was obscene was to be judged by “the present critical point in the compromise
between candor and shame at which the community may have arrived here and now.”185
When a magazine was banned from the mails on grounds of obscenity, there
was no administrative review, formal or informal.186 The decisions to ban were made
175 See id. at 437.
176 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932 (1919).
177 See Fred D. Ragan, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., and the
Clear and Present Danger Test for Free Speech: The First Year, 1919, 58 J. AM. HIST. 24,
42–45 (1971).
178 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Milwaukee Leader Case, 112 NATION 428, 428 (1921). See
also CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 148, at 199 (“A newspaper
editor fears being put out of business by the administrative denial of the second-class mailing
privilege much more than the prospect of prison subject to a jury trial.”).
179 See Robertus, supra note 114, at 7–8, 12 (noting that prior to losing second-class mailing
privileges, individual Esquire issues were excluded).
180 See supra notes 113–28 and accompanying text.
181 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934); 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
182 One Book Called Ulysses, 5 F. Supp. at 184–85.
183 113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
184 Id. at 731–32.
185 Id. at 732.
186 PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 84, at 38.
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by the head lawyer of the Post Office Department, based on recommendations of
subordinate lawyers.187 There was no obligation on the part of any Department of-
ficials to hear competing views on the work, or to obtain the opinions of experts
qualified to discuss the material’s social value or its likely effect on viewers.188 The
publisher denied access to the mails could go to court if prepared to pay the cost, but
the courts continued to defer to postal authorities.189 Despite the Post Office Depart-
ment’s expansive authority to exclude periodicals for obscenity, Postmaster General
James Farley, channeling the more permissive mood of the times and the liberal bent
of the Roosevelt administration, seems to have been less vigilant about bans on
obscenity than his predecessors, and they declined during the 1930s.190
When it came to second-class permit denials of obscene material, the Postmaster
General’s powers were also sparingly used. In the 1930s, the Post Office Department
generally did not revoke a publication’s second-class rate until a few issues had been
deemed nonmailable for obscenity, and even then, this was rarely done.191 In the
middle of the decade, the Department developed a program of “voluntary censorship,”
in which it warned publishers of allegedly obscene periodicals that they would lose
their second-class privileges if they continued to produce nonmailable matter.192 This
was part of the Department’s new, more liberal policy. The Post Office Department’s
chief lawyer encouraged publishers to submit proofs in advance of mailing to obtain
an advisory opinion;193 Post Office Department officials would sometimes meet with
publishers in person to work out changes before a publication was mailed.194 In the
1930s, the Post Office Department deemed several issues of Esquire obscene and
warned the publisher that the magazine would lose its second-class rate unless it
“cleaned up.”195 The publisher recalled:
I was making monthly trips to Washington, taking the dummy of
the next issue of Esquire to go to press, and going over it page by
page . . . to get [the head lawyer’s] clearance prior to publication.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 39.
190 See CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 340 (ex-
plaining that the Post Office Department, under Postmaster General James Farley, had a program
in place whereby publishers could have their issues screened by the Department prior to publi-
cation to determine if the issue contained obscene content). Postmaster General James Farley was
replaced by Frank C. Walker who ended the screening program. Robertus, supra note 114, at 6.
191 See Robertus, supra note 114, at 7–8, 12 (noting that in the late 1930s to early 1940s
Esquire had four of its issues deemed nonmailable but did not have its second-class rate re-
voked until after the Post Office Department implemented new standards on April 21, 1942).
192 See supra notes 190–203 and accompanying text.
193 See CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 340.
194 See Robertus, supra note 114, at 8.
195 See id. at 7.
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I hated doing [this] . . . but it seemed the only safe way to stay
out of trouble.196
Despite the slight relaxation of the policies around exclusion and second-class
permit denials, the Post Office Department’s censorship of the mails attracted increas-
ing criticism in the 1930s. Many lawyers, scholars, and activists concerned with civil
liberties began to question the Department’s extraordinary power over circulation of
the printed word.197 Wrote lawyer Theodore Kadin in 1939, channeling Holmes and
Brandeis, the Post Office Department’s authority over “effective communication of the
written word without judicial review” raised social and constitutional issues “of un-
questioned magnitude and importance.”198 One lawyer writing in the Michigan Law
Review in 1938 described the Supreme Court’s earlier decisions on the postal power
as “clear infringement[s] of the freedom of the press.”199 “Pre-censorship . . . has firmly
entrenched itself within the citadel,” wrote Kadin.200 “Before . . . written idea[s] may
pass from the thinker to the people, [they] must be judged by the appointee of the
political majority. . . . As a practical matter, therefore, the most extensive medium
of communication may be dominated by a very few men.”201
III. THE RISE OF FREE SPEECH
The period between Milwaukee Leader and the end of the 1930s witnessed a
revolution in the law of free speech, and public attitudes toward freedom of speech, that
must be understood in order to contextualize the dialogue that would ensue around the
Esquire case. In the span of less than 20 years, the deferential police power review of
speech restrictions had begun to be replaced by a civil libertarian approach character-
ized by heightened judicial scrutiny of restraints on expression.202 In a series of cases
in the 1930s, the Supreme Court struck down content-based restrictions of speech203
and began to articulate what became the doctrinal and philosophical foundations of
modern First Amendment law, based on the centrality of free expression to partici-
patory democracy.
Among the public, free speech ascended to the position of a “national cause” and
a symbol of the American way of life.204 One historian has written of the public’s
196 ARNOLD GINGRICH, NOTHING BUT PEOPLE: THE EARLY DAYS AT ESQUIRE A PERSONAL
HISTORY 1928–1958 158 (1971). “I would make all the required revisions on the spot, and some
of the things I had to ‘tone down’ seemed to me to be a case of bending over backward to avoid
offending even the most sensitive of sensibilities to a degree that was nearly ludicrous.” Id.
197 See RICHARD W. STEELE, FREE SPEECH IN THE GOOD WAR 11 (1999).
198 ADMIN. PROC. IN GOV. AGENCIES, 76TH CONG., 10 (1940).
199 Deutsch, supra note 106, at 704.
200 Kadin, supra note 119, at 548.
201 Id.
202 See discussion infra Section III.B.
203 See discussion infra Section III.B.
204 STEELE, supra note 197, at 11.
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“celebration of free expression in the decade leading up to World War II.”205 To many
Americans, free expression became a “lodestar,” the shining star in the constellation of
constitutional rights.206 It was in the 1930s, in the words of First Amendment scholar
Harry Kalven, that speech “start[ed] to win.”207
A. Changing Social Perspectives on Free Expression
The government’s intense suppression of dissent during the First World War led
to a cultural backlash. By the mid-1920s, many Americans had come to realize that
the wartime repression had been excessive and unjustified, and that the dissenters
had not been as threatening to national security as the Wilson administration had
suggested.208 Although much of the public continued to hold conservative views on
speech, insisting that the protection of the common welfare required the suppression
of dangerous or dissenting ideas, there was at the same time increasing hostility
toward the efforts of authorities and self-appointed “reformers” to enforce their visions
of the public good.209 As mentioned earlier, the 1920s saw the relaxation of repressive,
Victorian-era moral strictures, particularly around sex, and the ascendance, among
many sectors of the populace, of a more liberal, cosmopolitan orientation.210 Free-
dom of expression assumed greater importance at a time when an increasing number
of Americans—epitomized by the so-called “lost generation”—were seeking personal,
social, and sexual liberation.211
Teachers began to rebel against interference in course content by religious zealots,
resistance that culminated in the infamous 1925 Scopes “Monkey” Trial.212 Reproduc-
tive rights advocates fought for the right to disseminate birth control information,
using the justification of freedom of speech.213 Book publishers, movie producers,
and radio broadcasters grew increasingly concerned with content-based restrictions
that affected not only their creative liberties but also their bottom line.214 For the first
time, freedom of speech became the focal point of major social debate.215 This concern
with free expression was fostered, in part, by the ACLU, formed in 1917 to protest
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the persecution of wartime dissenters.216 During the 1920s, the ACLU became an
influential national organization engaged in publicity, litigation, and lobbying on
civil rights and civil liberties issues, especially freedom of speech.217 Perhaps more
than any other force in American society in the 1920s, the ACLU was responsible
for the “spread of the gospel of free expression.”218
The Great Depression triggered unprecedented popular support for freedom of ex-
pression and civil liberties more broadly. The economic crisis precipitated intense
critiques of the prevailing order and massive social unrest.219 Communism, Socialism,
and other radical ideologies gained large and receptive audiences.220 Recent memories
of wartime repression and hysteria made intellectuals and the growing civil libertarian
community vigilant to prevent persecution of contrarian views.221 The dire economic
circumstances had a leveling effect, spurring many previously unconcerned Ameri-
cans to contemplate issues of social justice and equality.222 As Americans of all
backgrounds and races stood in breadlines, the earlier notion of social hierarchies
and divisions as natural and immutable began to collapse.223 The contingency and
precariousness of social privilege was revealed, engendering greater sympathies toward
the poor and oppressed.224 Membership in the ACLU increased as the organization
gained favorable publicity and came to be regarded as an advocate of freedom, equal-
ity, and “human relief at a time in which such relief was a crying need.”225 The ACLU
became the nation’s premiere civil liberties activist group, and it was involved in
several prominent free speech cases, including many before the Supreme Court.226
It was in this milieu that the Court began to retreat from its perfunctory and
generally dismissive treatment of free speech issues. Beginning in 1931, it began to
incorporate into First Amendment doctrines the more liberal views on free expres-
sion that much of the public already embraced.227
B. The Supreme Court on Speech
The doctrinal origins of modern First Amendment law, as is well-known, can
be traced to the series of opinions, concurrences, and dissents in the immediate
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post–World War I era in which Justices Holmes and Brandeis attempted to replace
the “bad tendency” test with a more speech-protective standard.228 In Abrams v. United
States,229 Holmes, dissenting from a majority opinion upholding a conviction under
the Espionage Act, enunciated a “clear and present danger” test, condemning govern-
ment “attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be
fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to
save the country.”230 Whether speech had a “tendency” to cause harm, however remote,
was not the appropriate inquiry in cases involving criminal punishment for seditious
utterances; rather, the test should be the actual likelihood of the speech causing immi-
nent harm.231 According to Holmes, the First Amendment protects utterances that seek
acceptance through the democratic processes of public discussion—“falsely shouting
fire in a theater and causing a panic” was the antithesis of democratic speech.232
While the Court’s conservative majority continued to analyze speech claims under
the bad tendency rule, Holmes and Brandeis kept clear and present danger alive in a
series of concurring and dissenting opinions.233 In his well-known concurrence in
Whitney v. California,234 Brandeis strengthened “clear and present danger”; the por-
tended harm must be extremely serious to justify the suppression of speech and so
imminent that there was no opportunity to avert it by discussion.235 Brandeis offered
justifications for protecting free speech that judges and theorists over the coming de-
cades would develop into principal rationales. Freedom of expression was a necessary
precondition of “public discussion,” which Brandeis described as central to democratic
self-governance.236 Through the process of freely discussing and debating social issues,
the public would discern the “common good” and govern itself accordingly.237
After sustaining sedition and syndicalism convictions with little debate, the Court
began reversing convictions and interpreting the First Amendment to require heightened
scrutiny of laws that restricted speech. Within ten years of the appointment of Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes in 1930, the Court had dramatically reshaped the
boundaries of the First Amendment and the police power.238 Drawing on Brandeis’s
rationale linking free speech to self-governance through “public discussion,” it
228 See infra notes 229–74 and accompanying text.
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234 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
235 Id. at 377 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., concurring).
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issued a series of decisions in which it expressed that speech was an especially im-
portant liberty that deserved judicial solicitude because of the “indispensable con-
nection” between speech rights and democracy.239 By the mid-1930s, the Court had
fashioned a dual standard of constitutional review in which judges would defer to
legislative regulation of the economy but scrutinize regulation of non-economic rights,
including the right to free speech.240 Speech rights were to be given greater protec-
tion than rights associated with economic activity because speech was believed to
be more closely connected to the process of democratic self-governance.241
Near v. Minnesota242 was a milestone in this transformation. Near involved the
judicial injunction of an anti-Semitic newspaper under a Minnesota gag law that
permitted state authorities to restrain a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspa-
per, magazine or other periodical.”243 The law had been passed to curb the tide of
“scandal sheet[s]” flooding the state’s major cities.244 A majority of the Supreme
Court reversed the injunction on First Amendment grounds.245 The gag law functioned
as a prior restraint, the majority concluded, by allowing a single judge to restrain all
future issues of the publication based on one issue.246 The majority constitutionalized
the common law rule against prior restraints, noting that such restraints were the “es-
sence of censorship.”247 For the first time, the Court rejected, on First Amendment
grounds, an action of the legislature that was clearly within the scope of its police
power.248 The Near decision, which generated almost no public criticism, marked
a historic turn and “indicated a deeper change in public attitudes.”249
In Near and Grosjean v. American Press Company,250 the next major case involv-
ing the First Amendment rights of newspapers, the Court emphasized the importance
of the press to democracy.251 The Near majority had spoken of the importance of pro-
hibitions on prior restraints in fostering a “vigilant and courageous press,” which was
essential to exposing official “malfeasance and corruption.”252 In Grosjean, a unani-
mous Court invalidated a Louisiana “license” tax imposed only on newspapers with
a certain minimum circulation.253 This indirect restriction on the press was unduly
239 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 149 (2000).
240 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
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244 Id. at 731 (Butler, J., dissenting).
245 Id. at 722–23 (“[W]e hold the statute . . . to be an infringement of the liberty of the
press. . . .”).
246 See id. at 713.
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248 See id. at 722–23.
249 WALKER, supra note 216, at 91.
250 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
251 See id. at 243; Near, 283 U.S. at 719–20.
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restrictive of an “untrammeled press as a vital source of public information.”254 Justice
Sutherland observed, “A free press stands as one of the great interpreters between the
government and the people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves.”255
By 1937, a majority of justices agreed that laws that had the potential to punish or
restrain speech should be reviewed with heightened scrutiny.256 The police power anal-
ysis had been replaced by a presumption in favor of protecting expression.257 Members
of the Court began to speak of freedom of speech as being in a “preferred position” in
the scheme of constitutional rights.258 In the words of Justice Cardozo, writing in Palko
v. Connecticut,259 freedom of speech “is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom.”260 Doctrinally, the demise of bad tendency was
achieved through the use of clear and present danger.261 De Jonge v. Oregon262 and
Herndon v. Lowry263 invoked clear and present danger to invalidate convictions under
criminal-syndicalist statutes under circumstances where a bad tendency analysis would
have sustained them.264 The Court emphasized that the proper way to defuse incite-
ments to overthrow the government was not through the suppression of speech, but
“free political discussion,” which could only be preserved through protecting the
constitutional right of free speech.265
C. Free Expression and Democracy
This shift in free speech doctrine, and the emerging rationales for protecting free
speech, cannot be understood apart from mounting concerns with the rise of fascist dic-
tatorships in Germany and Italy. Americans responded to the atrocities perpetuated
by these regimes by working diligently to differentiate the American way of life and
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protecting personal freedoms at home.266 Intellectuals and other thought leaders of the
1930s emphasized “the importance of the rule of law and the notion that the people
were protected from arbitrary state power by a tradition of constitutionalism.”267 There
was an emphasis on the “cultural[ly] and political[ly] pluralis[t]” nature of American
democracy, in contrast to fascism and Nazism.268 In the 1930s, “the idea of America as
a democracy dramatically expanded its cultural meaning.”269 It signified “not only a
society based on freedom, but a society opposed to tyranny and arbitrariness; an antito-
talitarian society that represented the world’s last best hope for rationality and truth.”270
The public looked to the judiciary to protect the rights of individuals and minorities,
especially their free expression rights, and in so doing, stave off totalitarianism.271 The
relationship between the suppression of speech and fascism was frequently raised in
litigation involving restrictions on free expression.272 The Committee for Industrial
Organization (CIO), challenging the efforts of Jersey City Mayor Frank Hague to pre-
vent the union from organizing in the city, likened his actions to European totalitarian-
ism, arguing “the parallel between this process and those current in the despotisms
abroad is too plain to be labored.”273 In upholding the district court’s ruling in favor
of the CIO, the Third Circuit noted that Hague’s policy of suppressing dissent
“would result eventually in the existence of but one political party as is now the case
under totalitarian governments.”274 The Supreme Court’s decision275 upholding the
Third Circuit in Hague coincided with the 150th anniversary of the Bill of Rights.276
The nation’s leaders “hailed the principles of the Bill of Rights, particularly toler-
ance for minorities, as the essence of American democracy.”277
With book burnings in Nazi Germany and the suppression of literary freedom in
Mussolini’s Italy, “censorship” acquired a “dirty word” quality.278 Joseph Goebbel’s
1933 bonfire of “un-German” and “immoral” books led to a public outcry and marches
in American cities.279 Newspapers reported it on front pages, and more than 100,000
people in New York City joined in a mass protest to coincide with the event.280 “Cen-
sorship” became something to be abhorred in a free society, something “inherently
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269 White, supra note 256, at 331.
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related to totalitarianism.”281 After the Nazi book burning, the American anti-censorship
movement was infused with new intensity.282 The Ulysses decision, handed down that
year, was seen by many as “America’s answer to Hitler’s repressions.”283
As tyranny worsened in Europe, facilitating participatory democracy and “public
discussion” became, more than ever, the Supreme Court’s rationale for protecting
speech rights. In Thornhill v. Alabama,284 Justice Murphy based his decision to strike
down an antipicketing ordinance on the importance of speech for self-governance:
“[T]he safeguarding of these rights to the ends that men may speak as they think on
matters vital to them . . . is essential to free government.”285 Justice Roberts used similar
logic in Cantwell v. Connecticut,286 overturning a breach of the peace conviction of a
Jehovah’s Witness who was peacefully denouncing the Catholic Church: “[T]he people
of this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opin-
ion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.”287 In Bridges v.
California,288 a majority on the Court, led by Justice Roberts, employed “clear and pres-
ent danger” to overturn a newspaper’s conviction of contempt by publication of
critical editorials on a pending court case.289 The whims, “preferences or beliefs” of
legislators or officials, “cannot transform minor matters of public inconvenience or
annoyance into substantive evils of sufficient weight to warrant the curtailment of
liberty of expression.”290 The First Amendment’s prohibitions on abridgements of
speech “must be taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language,
read in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.”291
D. Free Expression in Wartime
The transformation in popular and official attitudes toward free speech was
reflected in the nation’s responses to wartime dissent. Though the outbreak of hos-
tilities in Europe in 1939 had created a mood of high anxiety in the United States
and a temporary wave of violence against communists, German-Americans, and
Jehovah’s Witnesses, the repression was often stanched by local officials.292 Public
opinion castigated political and religious intolerance and blatant abuses of civil rights.293
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The public, the courts, the media, and the government expressed an overwhelming
desire to avoid the civil liberties disasters of the previous war.294 Even before the attack
on Pearl Harbor, the Roosevelt administration worked hard to assuage the public that
in the event of war, freedom of speech would be protected at all costs.295 In 1940,
Roosevelt proclaimed, “Free speech and a free press are still in the possession of the
people . . . and it is important that it should remain there. For suppression of opinion
and censorship of news are among the mortal weapons that dictatorships direct against
their own peoples. . . .”296 Freedom of expression had become such an important public
issue that in his January 6, 1941 speech rallying Americans to prepare for likely war,
Roosevelt invoked “four essential human freedoms,” with the first being “freedom
of speech and expression.”297 After Pearl Harbor, Attorney General Francis Biddle,
in a speech commemorating the 152nd anniversary of the Bill of Rights, reminded
the nation that “[e]very man . . . who cares about freedom must fight [to protect it]
for the other man with whom he disagrees.”298 The Department of Justice was
praised for sparingly prosecuting dissenters for sedition, and there were far fewer
prosecutions for seditious expression than during the First World War.299 In 1941, the
New York Times praised Biddle for dismissing complaints lodged against three men for
seditious utterances.300 Commending Congress, the people, and the courts for their
absence of hysteria in regard to the war, the Times urged a “deeper toleration of the
‘thought we hate.’”301
This anti-censorship, free speech mentality mapped less completely onto the realm
of culture. While the war and Nazi brutalities pushed many Americans to deepen
their commitment to anti-censorship principles and to oppose official restrictions on
art, literature, and film, some were less wary about content-based regulations of popular
culture.302 They believed that movies, magazines, and novels were unrelated to the pro-
cesses of democracy and could pose moral threats to society, especially to youth.303 So-
cial conservatives, alarmed by more permissive views on sex and more sexually
explicit material in popular culture, ramped up their efforts to eradicate “indecent”
culture through both legal and extralegal means.304 During the war, the pulp magazine
craze rose to new heights, fueled by the disposable income of a more prosperous
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populace (the war had ended the Depression);305 demand for pin-ups and men’s
magazines was especially high among GIs overseas.306 The NODL continued to combat
what it saw as the rising tide of “indecent literature.”307 By the end of the war, amidst
nationwide calls for tolerance in the political sphere, civil libertarians were reporting
an increase in efforts to suppress entertainment and literature on moral grounds.308
This was the social and legal environment in which the Esquire case unfolded.
IV. THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT’S “DECENCY CRUSADE”
A. The Crackdown on Magazines
In 1942, Postmaster General Frank Walker began his crackdown on pulp maga-
zines.309 This started in April, when the Post Office Department announced that it was
initiating a new policy with regard to second-class mailing privileges.310 In response to
criticism of the Department’s practices, it declared that it would now offer publishers
hearings before revoking their second-class privileges.311 Under its new rules, hearings
would be offered to all publishers whose second-class privileges were to be terminated
for nonmailability.312 At the same time, the Department announced that it would no
longer rule in advance on the mailability of material.313 The Department further stated
that, rather than relying on its advisory opinions, publishers should be guided by a sense
of “decency and good morals” in determining whether or not to deposit material in
the mail.314
Immediately after the declaration of the new policy, the Post Office Department in-
formed dozens of publishers, mostly small-scale publishers of pulp and “girlie” maga-
zines, that they were losing their second-class permits.315 The basis for the decision, in
most cases, was that two or three previous issues had been deemed nonmailable on
account of obscenity.316 Publishers received letters informing them that past issues
were nonmailable, and that unless they appeared at a hearing to “show cause” why
their publications were not obscene, their second-class privileges would be denied.317
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a report for the Postmaster General).
314 Id. at 14.
315 See id. at 15–19.
316 Id. at 18.
317 Id. at 12.
316 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 27:287
Noll regularly communicated with Walker, asking him to revoke the privileges of
publications on the list.318 “The new Postmaster General,” Noll wrote to his col-
leagues, “has been cooperating with me splendidly.”319
The “hearings” were a sham. Post Office Department officials served as both pros-
ecutors and judges.320 The hearings officers were senior postal employees; “[a]ll were
normally assigned to other duties and none was . . . trained for judging obscenity.”321
Both sides were allowed to offer arguments, briefs, and evidence.322 At the conclusion
of the hearing, the officers prepared a report for the Postmaster General, but the rec-
ommendations of the hearing officers were not binding.323 “The [P]ostmaster [G]eneral
might accompany his [final decision] with a statement of opinion or reasons” but was
not required to offer an explanation for his decision.324 Most magazines, unable to
afford the cost of travel to Washington for what was generally recognized to be a
futile exercise, declined the hearing and forfeited their second-class privileges.325
One of the first magazines to lose its second-class permit under the crackdown
was Real Screen Fun, a low-budget pulp magazine featuring pictures of scantily clad
women.326 The publisher did not respond to the “show cause” order, and its second-
class privileges were revoked.327 A men’s magazine called Argosy did not appear at
a hearing and as a result lost its permit.328 Stories that were cited as objectionable
included ‘Sex Outrages by Jap Soldiers,’ ‘The G-String Murders’ and ‘How Paris
Apaches Terrorize Nazis in Girl Orgies.’329
Romantic Story, Real Detective and Laff lost their mailing permits.330 The magazine
Front Page Detective was issued a “show cause” order citing several stories that made
it allegedly nonmailable, including “Mystery of the Beheaded Bride” and “He Crawled
Through the Window and into My Bed.”331 Sleek magazine, cited for stories such as
“Female Beauty Around the World,” skipped its revocation hearing, lost its second-
class privileges, and shut down.332 Between May and August 1942, thirty-nine
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magazines were denied second-class privileges for their purported obscenity.333 It’s
unlikely that any of these the publications would have been obscene under the Ulysses
or Parmelee tests334 or even the restrictive Hicklin test.335 Operating without clear
statutory commands or oversight from the courts, postal officials censored a wide
swath of nonobscene material that violated the NODL’s moral code.336
Postal officials knew that the loss of second-class privileges meant the end for
most publications. Using first-class mail was too expensive, the third class included
only matter that weighed less than eight ounces, and fourth class was prohibitively
costly and slow.337 As commentators observed, revocation of second-class mailing
rates meant life or death for a magazine.338
B. The Crackdown Attracts Criticism
The ACLU and its anti-censorship subcommittee, the National Council for Free-
dom from Censorship, which had long been monitoring the activities of the NODL, reg-
istered immediate concerns with the decency crackdown.339 In May 1942, ACLU
leaders contacted the Department of Justice with complaints about the permit
revocations—the seemingly arbitrary decisions to revoke, the meaningless hearings,
and the Department’s broad and vague definition of obscenity.340 The organization
also looked for a test case to challenge the revocations in court.341 ACLU lawyers
wrote to several magazines that had their privileges revoked, encouraging them to
seek judicial review.342
In the summer of 1942, the decency campaign gained national attention when
the legendary tabloid The National Police Gazette lost its second-class privileges.343
Started in 1845, the Gazette was infamous for its sporting news, lurid crime stories,
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and provocative pictures of women.344 It was generally regarded as harmless enter-
tainment, ubiquitous in barbershops and other public places where men congre-
gated.345 In August of 1942, the Post Office Department announced that it was going
to revoke the Gazette’s privileges because it was “profitably pandering to the lewd
and lascivious.”346 After a hearing, in which postal officials refused to put into the
record a key piece of evidence introduced by the publisher, the tabloid’s second-
class status was revoked.347 The decision elicited a wave of protest.348 Throughout
the country, newspapers published articles in disbelief;349 the Gazette was racy, but
in no way obscene. The Police Gazette revocation made clear that the Post Office
Department defined obscenity without regard to public norms and standards.
The day after the Police Gazette’s revocation, the ACLU held a conference with
a large group of magazine publishers on the possibility of “joint action” against the
Post Office Department.350 The ACLU also wrote to Senator Kenneth McKellar,
Chairman of the Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads, calling to his attention
that:
[E]xtraordinary drive being undertaken by the Post Office Depart-
ment against allegedly obscene magazines[.] We are, of course, in
favor of excluding from the mails any matter which is in fact
obscene, but we are wholly opposed to an arbitrary system of
exclusion which permits a few postal officials to exercise their
unreviewed judgment in so debatable a field.351
The ACLU proposed a bill adopting the system then effective in the Customs
Department;352 under the Tariff Act of 1930, Customs officials had to go to a federal
344 See Matthew Huttner, The Police Gazette, 67 AM. MERCURY 15, 16–18 (1948).
345 See id. at 15.
346 78 CONG. REC. 3822 (1943) (citing Exit the Police Gazette, CHICAGO DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 23, 1942).
347 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, P.O. Department Continues Obscenity
Crusade (Sept. 28, 1942), in AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PAPERS 88, Princeton Uni-
versity (microfilm, University of Washington).
348 See Culliane, supra note 333 (noting the Postmaster’s actions “aroused more criticism
than any similar action in a long while”).
349 See 79 CONG. REC. 3822 (1943) (citing various newspaper criticisms).
350 Letter from Roger Baldwin to Joseph Fulling Fishmen (Sept. 30, 1942), in 2436 AMER-
ICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PAPERS 93, Princeton University (microfilm, University of
Washington).
351 Letter from Elmer Rice to Hon. Kenneth McKellar (Sept. 25, 1942), in 2436 AMERI-
CAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PAPERS 86–87, Princeton University (microfilm, University of
Washington).
352 See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union (Apr. 21, 1943), in 2436 AMERICAN
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PAPERS 149, Princeton University (microfilm, University of Wash-
ington).
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district court to obtain permission to ban an allegedly obscene item from the coun-
try.353
The second-class privilege denials continued into 1943 with no signs of abat-
ing.354 By the middle of 1943, Walker had denied second-class rates to more than
seventy periodicals.355 Walker’s crackdown was exerting a chilling effect on all
magazines, not only the pulps. Afraid of having their mailing privileges denied,
publishers were eliminating articles with references to sex; they put more clothes on
their female models, and got rid of ads that could be considered suggestive.356 Ac-
cording to one source, “The Post Office Department’s banning action has reached
such tremendous proportions that many American newspaper and magazine publish-
ers are today definitely intimidated.”357
C. The American Way of Life
The controversy over the second-class permit denials escalated in March 1943
when the popular syndicated columnist Drew Pearson obtained information about,
and subsequently revealed in his column, Walker’s cooperation with Bishop Noll:
Efficient Postmaster General Frank Walker has got himself into
a situation whereby certain zealots of the church to which he
belongs have become unofficial censors of American magazines.
. . . .
The situation has gone so far that scores of American magazines,
before going to press, send their manuscripts to the representa-
tive of Bishop John F. Noll of the [NODL], where they are
examined . . . . 
. . . .
Through the powerful weapon of removing magazines from the
second class mailing list, a most effective censorship is being
used daily.358
353 See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union: Union Asks Senate Investigate P.O.
“Decency Crusade,” (Apr. 26, 1943), in 2436 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION PAPERS
150–51, Princeton University (microfilm, University of Washington).
354 Robertus, supra note 114, at 15.
355 See id.
356 See id. at 18, 21.
357 78 CONG. REC. 3821 (1943).
358 Drew Pearson, Washington Merry-Go-Round, MICH. DAILY, Mar. 25, 1943, at 2.
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Members of the ACLU wrote to twenty-six Senators suggesting an investigation
of “the present censorship by the Post Officer Department of magazines alleged to
be obscene,” pointing out that Walker’s target list closely paralleled the list of the
NODL.359
Pearson’s revelations attracted the attention of cigar-chewing, bull-voiced North
Dakota Republican Senator William “Wild Bill” Langer, who damned the second-
class permit revocations as undemocratic and called the “so-called hearings” a
“mockery of justice.”360 “[I]f th[is] policy of censorship is permitted to continue, there
is nothing to prevent the Postmaster General, who is also chairman of the National
Democratic Committee, from using the second-class mailing privilege as a political
plum,” he warned.361 Langer introduced what would become a recurring theme in
the later debate over Esquire when, on the floor of the Senate, he made the connection
between Walker’s actions and fascist dictatorship:
Today we are fighting a global war for the purpose of protecting
our God-given privileges as cited in the Bill of Rights. . . . Our
boys on every front are dying so that we at home may enjoy
freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion
which constitute the American way of life. It is cruel to think
that here at home these freedoms are threatened.362
Langer submitted a resolution directing the Committee on Post Offices to con-
duct an investigation of the Post Office Department.363 Langer also introduced
legislation, modeled on Tariff Act, which would “require the Post Office Department
to go to court” every time it wanted to ban or deny second-class rates to purportedly
obscene material.364
Walker retaliated bitterly against his critics. Although Walker had been carrying
out the wishes of Noll and the NODL,365 the organization’s campaign clearly reso-
nated with his own principles and beliefs.366 Zechariah Chafee, one of Walker’s
contemporaries, described Walker as a man sincerely interested in bettering “the
morals of the country,” who felt he had “an obligation to do something about it
when the opportunity is right before him.”367 For Walker, the “decency campaign”
359 Seeks Probe of Ban on Many Magazines, GAZETTE & DAILY (Pennsylvania), Apr. 24,
1943, at 29.
360 78 CONG. REC. 3820 (1943).
361 Id.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 See PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 84, at 73.
365 See Pearson, supra note 358, at 2.
366 See CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 300.
367 Id.
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had become a personal crusade.368 Shortly after Langer’s tirade in the Senate, Walker
declared that he would continue his policy despite the criticism.369 With “his blue
eyes gleam[ing] and his . . . hands knotted . . . into hard fists,” he told the newspaper
the Catholic Advance, “I’m going ahead with the enforcement of post office
regulations—let the chips fall where they may. In public office you have to expect
controversies.”370 For the first time, Walker offered a rationale for the permit de-
nials, a “subsidy” view of the second-class rate: “I’m not a censor, and that is not the
function of my office. But I don’t think Congress ever intended to subsidize some
of the stuff that is being carried at huge cost to the government.”371
V. ESQUIRE
Walker’s success in shutting down several of the smaller pulps emboldened him
to go after bigger targets. In September 1943, Walker issued the popular men’s maga-
zine Esquire an order of revocation, informing the publishers of the magazine that
unless they could “show cause” why Esquire was not obscene, their second-class permit
would be revoked.372 Esquire had a circulation of over 600,000, with GIs overseas rep-
resenting a substantial portion of its readership.373 The monthly cost of mailing Esquire
at second-class rates was about $9,500, approximately $100,000 annually.374 If the
magazine lost its second-class rates, mailing costs would exceed $600,000 a year.375
While Esquire had been on the NODL’s banned list for several years,376 Bishop
Noll removed it in 1942, over a year before Walker issued his revocation order.377
According to Noll, Walker had initiated the order against Esquire on his own
accord, without any prompting.378 Noll publicly denied that he had anything to do
with Walker’s decision to go after Esquire.379 There was “no collusion, no correspon-
dence,” Noll told Time magazine.380 “As far as I know [Walker] doesn’t think of me
in connection with this Esquire business.”381
368 See Resents Charges Against Church: Walker Means Business in Fight on Dirty Maga-
zines, CATH. ADVANCE (Kansas), Apr. 9, 1943, at 5.
369 See id.
370 Id.
371 Id.
372 Respondent’s Brief at 4, Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (No. 399).
373 HUGH MERRILL, ESKY: THE EARLY YEARS AT ESQUIRE 93 (1995).
374 See Robertus, supra note 114, at 29.
375 See Respondent’s Brief, supra note 372, at 38.
376 See NOLL, supra note 58, at 217.
377 See Esquire Banned, TIME, Jan. 10, 1944, at 46.
378 See id.
379 See id.
380 Id.
381 Id.
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A. Esquire Magazine
Esquire magazine was launched in Chicago in 1933.382 It was the nation’s first
“men’s lifestyle” magazine, featuring articles on food, drink, fashion, home décor, and
etiquette, aimed at an audience of upwardly mobile men.383 The magazine also fea-
tured “high culture,” offering articles on art, sophisticated music, and current affairs.384
Some of the nation’s most highly regarded writers, including F. Scott Fitzgerald,
Ernest Hemingway, Langston Hughes, Theodore Dreiser, and John Steinbeck
published short stories in Esquire.385 The magazine’s publisher wanted an audience
interested in high culture because his advertisers needed to appeal to men with dis-
posable income.386 At the same time, he wanted a “manly” emphasis, which was pro-
vided by sex—scantily clad pinups and bathroom humor were the most popular
features of the magazine.387 When the magazine’s fortunes began to decline in the late
1930s, publisher David Smart upped its sexually themed content.388 In the words of one
historian of Esquire, “[l]iterature, and everything else . . . took a back seat to sex.”389
In 1940, the “Varga girl” first appeared in Esquire.390 The Varga girl was a painted
illustration of a busty “pin-up girl” by the illustrator Alberto Vargas.391 She was
“usually blonde or red-haired, long-legged . . . and sultry.”392 The Varga girl was
intended to represent the idealized female sex symbol—her bust and hips were ex-
aggerated; she wore a pouty look, and was often portrayed reclining or in other
sexually suggestive poses.393 Varga girl illustrations usually appeared as full page
features or gatefolds.394 The images were often accompanied by short captions or
verses containing sexual double entendres.395 The Varga girls boosted Esquire’s
popularity and made it one of the nation’s bestselling magazines.396
Esquire’s fortunes surged even higher when it made a profitable alliance with
the U.S. government at the beginning of the war.397 The publisher “convinced the
military that a magazine filled with pin-ups, racy cartoons, and camp humor was
382 Sullivan, supra note 17, at 33.
383 See id. at 33.
384 Id. at 36.
385 See MERRILL, supra note 373, at 155–56.
386 See Sullivan, supra note 17, at 36 (noting Esquire sold for an “outrageous fifty cents” due
to its marketing as a “sophisticated magazine for the urban, well-to-do, fashion-forward man”).
387 Id.
388 See MERRILL, supra note 373, at 81.
389 Id.
390 See Sullivan, supra note 17, at 46–47.
391 Id. at 44, 47.
392 Id. at 47.
393 Id. at 47–49.
394 Id. at 44.
395 See MERRILL, supra note 373, at 89.
396 See id. at 87.
397 See id. at 93.
2018] THE ESQUIRE CASE: A LOST FREE SPEECH LANDMARK 323
essential for military morale.”398 Esquire was selling 69,000 subscriptions to service-
men by 1943 and an additional 30,000 were distributed to military bases in Europe.399
Esquire sold most of its copies to the U.S. government.400 GIs put Varga girl pictures
in their lockers; the pin-up girl became the symbol of the “girl left behind,” and the
American Dream of home, marriage, and family that soldiers fought for.401 The ties
between the Second World War and Esquire were strong. Comedian Bob Hope once
commented, “Our American troops are ready to fight at the drop of an Esquire.”402
B. An “Obscene, Lewd, and Lascivious Character”
According to the “show cause” order, nine of Esquire’s 1943 issues were non-
mailable because of matters of an “obscene, lewd, and lascivious character.”403 Eighty-
six out of a total of 1,972 pages of text and artwork were cited as obscene.404 The Varga
girl accounted for sixteen of twenty-three allegedly obscene items.405 Phrases such as
“son of a bitch,” “whore” and “ass” were objected to, as were articles and cartoons with
sexual overtones.406 Cited pieces included a theatrical review of a bawdy Broadway
musical called Star and Garter,407 a series of articles exposing the tawdry world of
the burlesque,408 a report of a typical night court in New York, discussing prostitutes
and venereal disease,409 and an article about a merchant marine sailor who got drunk
and used indelicate language.410 One cartoon depicted a group of soldiers surrounded
by a group of women with spears.411 The caption read, “It’s no use, Sarge, we are out-
numbered. Yippee.”412 Another portrayed a girl who asked a soldier, “Would you like
to see where I was operated on?” “No,” the soldier quipped. “I hate hospitals.”413
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 See Sullivan, supra note 17, at 51.
401 See BUSZEK, supra note 306, at 185; Sullivan, supra note 17, at 53.
402 Sullivan, supra note 17, at 50.
403 Order of the Postmaster General Revoking Second Class Privileges, Order No. 23459,
Dec. 30, 1943.
404 The Esquire Case—A Novel Extension of the Postmaster-General’s Powers of Clas-
sifying Mail, supra note 105, at 738 n.24.
405 Order of the Postmaster General Revoking Second Class Privileges, Order No. 23459,
Dec. 30, 1943.
406 Transcript of Record at 273–74, 290–91, 349, Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146
(1946) (No. 399).
407 Id. at 3.
408 Id. at 39.
409 Id. at 39–40.
410 Id. at 40.
411 Id. at 32.
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413 Id. at 40.
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When he received the “show cause” order, editor Arnold Gingrich retorted that
Esquire was not obscene or lewd, and was a great “morale booster” for the nation.414
Arnold Gingrich, Editor of Esquire did not agree that the drawings were as de-
scribed by the Post Office Department, “[T]hey have been very popular with the
armed forces, not only with the men but the officials in charge.”415 Gingrich filed an
answer denying the charges, and his lawyers asked for a hearing.416 Newspapers
began a steady drumbeat of criticism against Walker and his “little Federal kangaroo
court” in the Post Office Department.417 Wrote the Cincinnati Enquirer, “With Ameri-
can fighting men in every clime calling for ‘pin-up girls’ to take their minds off the
muck and horror of the war, must editors fear to publish the picture of a bathing girl
lest they be the next to receive an imperious summons from Mr. Walker?”418
On October 14, 1943, Walker appointed a hearing board consisting of three
senior Post Office Department officials.419 To avoid charges of being arbitrary and
undemocratic, Walker heeded the suggestion of the Department’s critics and com-
missioned experts to weigh in on the issue of Esquire’s obscenity—the value of the
magazine to society and its likelihood of corrupting youth.420 Esquire’s publishers
responded by commissioning their own witnesses, including Ivy League psychia-
trists and some of the most prestigious writers and literary critics in the nation.421 It
was reported that Esquire paid some of the witnesses as much as $500 a day ($7,000
in 2017 dollars) for their testimony.422
Walker soon realized that he had underestimated the difficulty of taking on a
large, well-funded publication like Esquire. While the fly-by-night pulps lacked the
resources to challenge the revocations, Esquire had the money and determination to
push back. Esquire’s publisher hired one of the most prestigious law firms in the
country—Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine and Wood,423 an elite New York firm that
represented prominent industrial and media giants, including the publishing com-
pany Time, Inc.424 Bruce Bromley of Cravath—a suave, dapper, seasoned litigator
noted for his brilliant and “hardball” trial tactics—was Esquire’s lead counsel.425
414 MERRILL, supra note 373, at 112.
415 ‘Varga’ Girl Stirs Up Row, MINNEAPOLIS STAR J., Sept. 13, 1943, at 2.
416 See Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 17–18.
417 Bureaucratic Censorship, CIN. ENQUIRER (Ohio), Sept. 14, 1943, at 4.
418 Id.
419 See Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 19.
420 See id. at ii, vi–vii; see also id. at 1356 (“Based on your examination . . . knowledge and
experience, will you tell the Board whether . . . anything in the material . . . in your opinion
[is] tending to corrupt morals of youth . . . ?”).
421 See GINGRICH, supra, note 196, at 161.
422 See Memorandum for Mr. O’Brien, November 9, 1943, Case File Relating to Esquire
Magazine, NARA.
423 MERRILL, supra note 373, at 109.
424 ROBERT T. SWAINE, 2 THE CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS 1891–1948 611 (1948).
425 See GINGRICH, supra note 196, at 159; That Wasn’t No Lady, NEWSWEEK, July 24,
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The magazine spent $40,000 in lawyers’ fees and $10,000 for stenographic tran-
scripts, in addition to thousands of dollars in witnesses’ fees.426 The hearings, which
stretched out for over two weeks and produced 1998 pages of testimony and hun-
dreds of pounds of exhibits,427 became a fiasco for the Post Office Department and
its counsel, who were clearly outmatched by Esquire’s superior lawyers. The charges
against the beloved magazine attracted substantial public interest, and the hearings
were reported daily in the nation’s press.428
C. Hearings
Esquire was represented in the hearings by Bromley;429 the Post Office Depart-
ment’s lawyers were William O’Brien, a longtime assistant to the Solicitor, and
Calvin Hassell, who was a former postal carrier.430 In his opening statement to the
hearing board, Bromley insisted that if Esquire were deemed obscene, it would create
a “very dangerous precedent” that will go “directly to the . . . guaranty of the free-
dom of the press.”431 Bromley condemned the Post Office Department for using the
outdated Hicklin test;432 under the recently articulated “community morals” standard,433
no obscenity, lewdness, or lasciviousness was involved, since the publication was
completely “in step with the times.”434 “What would our Victorian forefathers have
thought . . . about the girls on the beaches at Coney Island or Newport? We have to
put our minds in tune with what the public generally thinks today.”435
The Post Office Department called nine witnesses to testify to the alleged obscenity
of the material and its supposedly adverse effects on readers.436 Several of the wit-
nesses were elderly, and a number of them were clergy.437 The Post Office Depart-
ment’s witnesses included a Methodist bishop, a rabbi, the Assistant Superintendent of
Schools of the District of Columbia, a psychiatrist at a federal psychiatric institution,
426 On Esquire’s preparation for the case, see GINGRICH, supra note 196; MERRILL, supra
note 373.
427 See generally Transcript of Record, supra note 406 (covering 1,998 pages).
428 See, e.g., George Dixon, Clergymen Declare Esquire Stirred Readers’ Indigestion, DAILY
NEWS, Nov. 5, 1943, at 392; George Dixon, Now Nobody’s Safe From P.O.; Home Journal
Is Called No Lady, DAILY NEWS, Nov. 4, 1943, at 255; Esquire Trial Nearing Close, NEWS-
J. (Ohio), Nov. 6, 1943, at 2.
429 GINGRICH, supra note 196, at 159.
430 See Transcript of Record, supra note 406.
431 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 32.
432 Id. at 1785.
433 See Parmelee v. United States, 113 F.2d 729 (1940) (holding that the test for obscenity
should evolve with the times).
434 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 1807.
435 Id. at 37.
436 As rebuttal witnesses the Post Office Department called Benjamin Karpman, John
Keating Cartwright, Peter Marshall, Solomon H. Metz, Chester W. Holmes, John W. Rustin,
Harvey W. Wiley, Edwin Holt Hughes, and Thomas Verner Moore. Id. at vi–vii.
437 See infra notes 439–62 and accompanying text.
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and a grey-haired former woman suffragist.438 Staring at a Varga girl centerfold,
Bishop Edwin Holt Hughes opined, “I wouldn’t care to exhibit it in my Sunday
schools.”439 A rabbi of the Adas Israel Congregation in Washington, D.C., told the
board, “[i]t seems to me that the whole atmosphere of this publication is such as to
reduce the main interest of living to sex, and then degrade sex to its lowest vulgar
expressions . . . such publication[s] [are] preparing the ground for the downfall of
our democratic system.”440 The Rev. Peter Marshall of Washington D.C.’s New York
Avenue Presbyterian Church testified that Esquire was “definitely indecent,” and
“calculated to lower the moral tone and degrade.”441 “I can’t see how such informa-
tion can add anything to public enlightenment or can make any contribution to
public morals.”442 In his brutal cross-examination of the Post Office Department’s
witnesses, Bromley got each of them to confess that none of them had read a single
issue of Esquire.443 Most had never heard of Esquire’s esteemed literary contribu-
tors, including Theodore Dreiser, F. Scott Fitzgerald, and Ernest Hemingway.444
“With the skill of a master of the leading question . . .” and a “wicked leer that
he himself characterized as ‘making him look like a dishonest Lincoln,’” Bromley
tricked several of the witnesses into labeling as “indecent” passages from respected,
innocuous magazines.445 He would present the witness with an image or a joke, and
the witness, assuming it was from Esquire, would immediately declare it obscene.446
Bromley would then reveal that it had been published in another magazine such as
Life and Reader’s Digest.447 On several occasions Bromley “coaxed [witnesses] to
speak in glowing terms of various religious figures, only to [point out] that they had
contributed to Esquire.”448 The press cheered Bromley’s successful efforts to make
the Department’s witnesses look like prudes, out of touch with present-day morals.449
The highlight of Bromley’s cross-examinations came when he played a trick on
feminist and suffragist Anna Kelton Wiley.450 Bromley, who was not above pulling
a fast one when the occasion seemed to merit it, asked Wiley, an elderly woman of
Victorian sensibilities, her opinion of a photograph of a woman in a swimsuit standing
438 See infra notes 439–62 and accompanying text.
439 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 1703.
440 Id. at 1594–95.
441 Id. at 1573, 1759.
442 Id. at 1569.
443 For the complete cross-examination of each witness, see id. at 1469–1549, 1557–66,
1569–88, 1595–1624, 1636–51, 1669–79, 1689–97, 1724–58.
444 See id. at 1726. On cross-examination, Thomas Verner Moore testified to having never
heard of Theodore Dreiser, F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernst Hemingway, and many others. See id.
445 GINGRICH, supra note 196, at 161.
446 See Sullivan, supra note 17, at 69.
447 See id.
448 Id. at 68.
449 See articles cited supra note 428.
450 See The Shapely Annette Shocks, Unshocks a Feminist Leader, DAILY NEWS (New York),
Nov. 6, 1943, at 4.
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on the beach.451 Wiley said that she did “not like the pose of her head, or attitude.”452
Bromley then revealed that the photograph had been taken thirty years prior and was
of the renowned, highly respected swimmer and feminist icon Annette Kellerman.453
“Well, you should have seen Mrs. Wiley trying to back water,” the New York Daily
News quipped.454
Thirty-eight witnesses—distinguished psychiatrists, authors, educators, publi-
cists, advertising executives and agents, and art specialists—testified for Esquire.455
Under Bromley’s skillful guidance, the witnesses attested that the magazine did not
incite indecent thoughts in average adult readers and was wholly in step with con-
temporary sensibilities.456 During the first week of testimony, the influential journal-
ist Raymond Gram Swing opined that Esquire published “first rate” fiction and
some of the finest writing in American periodical literature.457 Principal Herbert
Smith of Chicago’s Francis Parker School claimed that Esquire was no more bawdy
than other magazine literature, and that he had found such words as “whore” in
Shakespeare and “son of a bitch” in the Chicago Tribune.458 Harvard psychiatrist
Kenneth Tillotson insisted that the Varga girl did not incite lascivious reactions, and
that she was a “good, clean picture as glorifying a good physique and good Ameri-
can womanhood.”459 Clement Fry, a leading mental health expert, alleged that
Esquire’s pictures were no more likely to arouse “libidinous thoughts” than the Bible.460
Louis J. Croteau, executive secretary of the Watch and Ward Society, a social reform
group in Boston long active in the book and theater censorship movement,461 testi-
fied that he found nothing lewd in Esquire and that it is “in the spirit of good, clean
slap-stick humor, and . . . we could all use a little more of it right now.”462
After the first week of testimony, the inept and overwhelmed Post Office De-
partment lawyers recognized that things were going poorly. The charge of obscenity
was backfiring, if not entirely destroyed. They then decided to change their tactics.
On October 25, 1943, at the beginning of the second week of the hearings, they
inserted a new charge against Esquire—that even if not “obscene,” Esquire did not
meet the fourth condition of the second-class mail statute, the requirement that a
periodical must be “originated and published for the dissemination of information
451 Id.
452 Id.
453 Id.
454 Id.
455 See Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 1837.
456 See, e.g., id. at 77.
457 Id. at 881.
458 Id. 273–74, 278–79.
459 Id. 136.
460 See id. at 593 (“[Boys] get stimulation from a lot of things. They get stimulation from
the Bible.”).
461 Id. at 396.
462 Id. at 451.
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of a public character or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some special
industry.”463 Esquire, they alleged, was not of a “public character”—it was not
contributing to the “public good.”464 This charge, and this interpretation of the Clas-
sification Act, was completely novel. As earlier mentioned, the fourth condition and
the “public character” requirement had been included in the Classification Act of
1879 for the purpose of distinguishing advertisements from periodicals (adver-
tisements were not of a “public character”), not as a measure of a publication’s
social value or social contribution.465 In the entire history of the Post Office Depart-
ment, the fourth condition had never been given this reading, nor used to deny a
publication second-class mailing rates.
This change posed a major problem for Esquire. Prior to the hearing, the Post
Office Solicitor had promised Esquire that it would base the revocation charges only
on the allegation that the publication was obscene.466 The matter of whether the
material met the fourth condition had not been briefed, or ever defined or litigated
in a previous case. After this alteration, which was profusely objected to by Bromley,467
the hearings continued, and Bromley directed the witnesses to address the allegation,
implied by the new charge, that Esquire did not “contribute to the public good.”468
Reeves Lowenthal, President of the Associated American Artists, stated that in
every one of the eleven issues containing allegedly obscene material, there had been
“substantial art content of high value.”469 Fred Siebert, director of the University of
Illinois School of Journalism testified that Esquire regularly published articles on
affairs of public character.470 The renowned writer H. L. Mencken, considered a master
of social criticism and the English language, testified to Esquire’s non-obscene
nature and its literary quality—“[p]ractically all the principal American authors have
written for it in my time.”471
“There is no conceivable obscenity in ‘son-of-a-bitch,’” Mencken told the hearing
board. “I have used it in my last book two or three times.”472 When asked about the
words, “street-walker,” “syphilis,” and “prostitute,” he replied, “I should say that
they are all perfectly harmless words. If you have to refer to the things you have to
indicate, you have to refer to them. I have seen them in the New York Times.”473
Commenting on a euphemism for the buttocks:
463 Id. at 1399.
464 See id.
465 See supra notes 131–51 and accompanying text.
466 See Letter from Calvin W. Hassel, Assistant Postmaster, to John F. Harding, Cravath,
DeGersdorff, Swaine & Wood (Oct. 9, 1943) (on file with the National Archives).
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Q. Now, what about the use of the words “sunny south”?
A. It is not alleged that “sunny south” is obscene, is it?
Q. I believe it is.
A. I can’t answer such a question. It is too absurd. Sunny south
is obviously an attempt at humor. I myself in such a situation use
the word “caboose”, but then everybody has his favorites. You
have to sometime in this life, living a biological life of mammals,
refer to backside, and in humorous writing, which this is, there
is an effort to invent charming and, if possible, euphemous back-
sides. There may not be enough euphemisms and this man is
inventing sunny south. I never heard it before. The idea that it was
obscene shocks me. I didn’t know anybody was absolutely so
indecent that he could consider it that way.474
He went to offer insight on the words “crap,” “bawdy house,” “ass,” and “did-
dle.”475 Mencken had such an enjoyable time testifying that he refused to even ac-
cept carfare for his trip to Washington from his home in Baltimore, saying that he
would gladly have paid to get in just for the entertainment value.476
Archibald M. Crossley, head of Crossley, Inc., an independent marketing and
research firm that specialized in gauging public opinion,477 testified that at the re-
quest of Esquire he had conducted a national poll on public perception of the Varga
Girl.478 In response to the question “do you consider these pictures to be obscene or
of an indecent character?” 77.6% said “No.”479 Abe Blinder, Esquire’s Director of
Circulation, stressed the connection between Esquire and the war effort.480 He testi-
fied that 23% of subscribers were servicemen, and that the War Department regularly
requested pin-up reprints.481
D. The Hearing Board’s Decision
The testimony ended on November 6, 1943.482 The hearing board deliberated for
a few days, then issued its advisory opinion on November 11.483 Two members of
474 Id. at 1145.
475 See id. at 1138, 1141–42, 1144, 1150.
476 GINGRICH, supra note 196, at 162.
477 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 1107.
478 Id. at 1109.
479 Id. at 1112.
480 Id. at 1391, 1393.
481 Id. at 1394, 1397.
482 Id. at 1857.
483 Id. at 1836.
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the board, Walter Myers, Fourth Assistant Postmaster General, and Frank Ellis,
Chief Clerk, concluded that Esquire was not obscene.484 “The proof was overwhelm-
ing that Esquire did not offend or violate the standards of the mores of our days,”
they wrote.485 They also rejected the Post Office Department’s lawyers’ efforts to
use the fourth condition against Esquire.486 Myers and Ellis recommended that
Esquire retain its second-class status and that the charges be dismissed.487
The third board member, Deputy First Assistant Postmaster General Tom
Cargill, voted for revocation.488 His dissent was based on the narrow ground that
since one item in the August 1943 issue was in his opinion obscene, the whole issue
was nonmailable.489 Since Esquire was deemed not to have mailed any August issue,
it “failed to issue at stated intervals a mailable issue” and therefore did not comply
with the Classification Act.490 Cargill added that he was not “satisfied to exonerate
the magazine” because many of its past issues “either overstep or are of the border-
line variety between the decent and the indecent.”491 If Esquire continued at the
second-class rate, publishing indecent material would be an “accustomed practice”
in the magazine industry, “aped by other borderline publications who look to
Esquire as the pace setter.”492
Cargill advised Walker to heed the interpretation of the fourth condition pre-
sented by the Post Office Department lawyers—as a “quality test” for publications.
He wrote that he was deeply “troubled” by the suggestion that Congress intended
to subsidize “matter of doubtful value to the public”493:
I doubt that if the general public, who are not subscribers, would
stand for this so-called subsidy if it was put to them in the light that
part of their tax money was being given to the owners and stock-
holders of Esquire to the extent of a half-million dollars a year.494
In mid-November, Cargill sent his decision to Walker; Walker deliberated for
over a month.495
484 Id. at 1838–39.
485 The Esquire Case—A Novel Extension of the Postmaster-General’s Powers of Classi-
fying Mail, supra note 105, at 739 n.24.
486 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 1839.
487 Id.
488 See id. at 1851–55.
489 See id. at 1852–54 (“[O]ne page in a magazine which is part and parcel of that magazine
makes the entire magazine unmailable.”).
490 Id. at 1855.
491 Id. at 1851.
492 Id. at 1853.
493 Id. at 1854.
494 Id.
495 Id. at 1851, 1856.
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E. Revocation
On December 30, 1943, Frank Walker—still determined to destroy Esquire—
issued an order revoking the magazine’s second-class privileges.496 He conceded that
Esquire was not technically obscene but, per Cargill’s suggestion, concluded that the
magazine had not met the criterion in the fourth condition of publishing “information
of a public character” or “literature, the sciences, . . . or some special industry.”497 De-
claring the language of the second-class statute “plain and specific,” Walker asserted
that, “A publication to enjoy these unique mail privileges and special preferences
is bound to do more than refrain from disseminating material which is obscene or
bordering on the obscene. It is under a positive duty to contribute to the public good
and the public welfare.”498
Walker explained that he construed the words of the fourth condition in light of the
passing observation of Justice Clarke in Milwaukee Leader that second-class rates were
“a frank extension of special favors to publishers because of the special contribution to
the public welfare [that] Congress believe[d] [wa]s derived from the . . . periodical
press.”499 Walker transformed this statement into a draconian requirement that any
periodical that sought to receive second-class rates had to demonstrate that it merited
them. Since second-class rates were below cost, Walker’s argument ran, they were
in effect an indirect governmental subsidy to the periodical at the expense of every
person mailing a letter or paying federal taxes.500 Drawing on Milwaukee Leader’s
“privilege doctrine,”501 Walker declared second-class mailing rates to be an “extraor-
dinary privilege” from the government; publishers that received it had to prove that
they were making an affirmative contribution to the public good.502 In Walker’s
opinion, Esquire—“indecent, vulgar, and risqué”—made no such contribution503:
Writings and pictures may be indecent, vulgar, and risque and
still not be obscene in a technical sense. Such writings and
pictures may be in that obscure and treacherous borderland zone
where the average person hesitates to find them technically
obscene, but still may see ample proof that they are morally
improper and not for the public welfare and the public good.
. . . .
496 Id. at 1856.
497 Id. at 1864.
498 Id. at 1862–63 (emphasis added).
499 Id. at 1858.
500 Id. at 1859.
501 See discussion supra Section II.C.
502 Transcript of Record, supra note 406, at 1863–64.
503 Id.
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When . . . they become a dominant and systematic feature they
most certainly cannot be said to be for the public good, and a
publication which uses them in that manner is not making the
“special contribution to the public welfare” which Congress
intended by the Fourth condition.504
Walker insisted that the revocation was merely the denial of a subsidy and
therefore did not involve “the right of freedom of speech, or of the freedom of the
press.”505 However, Walker apparently had sufficient doubts about his novel con-
struction of the fourth condition that he postdated his order to February 28, 1944,
to permit a court to review and settle the matter.506
Walker’s “far-reaching . . . decision”507 “by which one man sets himself up to
decide what is in the public welfare” represented a “sinister” blow508 to freedom of
the press, Esquire publisher David Smart told reporters. The ruling left Smart
“speechless.”509 “The postmaster general has gone against his own board’s decision
and that is unbelievable.”510 Loss of second-class rates portended the “eventual eco-
nomic death” of Esquire, “and that is one way to strangle a free press.”511
VI. A CAUSE CÉLÈBRE
On New Year’s Day 1944, the day Walker’s order was reported in the press, the
Esquire case became a “cause célèbre.”512 With Walker’s interpretation of the fourth
condition as sweeping authority to exclude material from second-class rates that he
believed did not “contribut(e) to the public welfare,” the Esquire case took on much
deeper significance than just a conflict over the meaning of obscenity and old-
fashioned versus modern views on sex. At a time when tyranny and dictatorship
loomed on the nation’s mind, the meaning of the case now revolved around what
many saw as a more ominous and troubling question—“how far the American
people are willing to allow one man . . . to go in suppressing a free press,” in the
504 Id. at 1863.
505 Id. at 1857.
506 See id. at 1865 (“In order to provide [Esquire] ample opportunity to appeal this order to
a court . . . to fully review and settle this matter . . . the order . . . will not become effective for
60 days.”).
507 Mildred Miller, Periodical, CIN. ENQUIRER (Ohio), Jan. 8, 1944, at 5. 
508 Ruling Against Esquire Hit By Editor and Publisher In Commenting Editorially, CIN.
ENQUIRER (Ohio), Jan. 8, 1944, at 3.
509 Speechless Esquire, TIME, Jan. 10, 1944, at 71.
510 Bar Esquire from Second Class Mail, ALTON EVENING TELEGRAPH (Illinois), Dec. 31,
1943, at 11.
511 Ruling Against Esquire Hit By Editor and Publisher In Commenting Editorially, supra
note 508, at 3.
512 B. Alsterlund, Literary By Degrees, 18 WILSON LIB. BULL. 420, 420 (1944).
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words of critic Bennett Cerf.513 The Esquire Affair had become an important “test
case in the fateful struggle now under way between popular government and bureau-
cratic power.”514
Walker’s ruling produced an outpouring of criticism from a wide and varied
cross-section of the populace.515 In recent years, few issues involving freedom of
speech and press had moved Americans so unanimously and deeply as Walker’s
decision. The response to Walker’s ruling was a testament not only to the popularity
of Esquire, but the strength of the public’s antipathy toward government censorship
of speech and ideas. Editorials blasted Walker’s “arbitrary action” as an infringe-
ment of the “inalienable rights of press and public.”516 Walker was denounced as a
self-proclaimed “super critic,”517 “virtual dictator of the American press,”518 and
“No. I judge of what the U.S. public should read.”519 Walker’s asserted authority was
“too much power for one man to wield in a democracy,” noted one editorial.520 Such
“arbitrary exercise[s] of power . . . should not go unchallenged in these days when
millions of American boys are out over the world fighting for the free way of life.”521
Comparisons to Hitler were frequent522 and perhaps inevitable. Newspaper
columnist Dorothy Thompson, who had made her name reporting from Germany on
the collapse of the Weimar Republic, noted that Hitler had purged galleries of
modern art, declaring that “any one who sees and paints a sky green and pastures
blue ought to be sterilized.”523 “Similarly Mr. Frank Walker . . . has now ruled that
the writings in the magazine Esquire are not literature and the reproductions not art,”
Thompson wrote.524 Observed one newspaper, “[t]he next step in this sort of thing
is book-burning such as the Nazis practiced when they came into power in Germany.
And book-burning, if supplied on the grounds of decency, can be extended to racial
and political grounds, just as it was in Germany.”525 The Lewisburg Journal com-
pared Walker’s actions to “Nazism in Germany during which time Goebbels stopped
the dissemination of literature contrary to party policy and belief . . . .”526 “The Nazis
513 Bennett Cerf, Trade Winds, SAT. REV., Feb. 5, 1944, at 20–21.
514 E. Lyons, Clinical Notes: The Esquire Affair, 58 AM. MERCURY 317, 317–18 (1944) (“As
long as one man remains the judge of any paper’s or magazine’s right to share in a general
privilege, freedom of press is an empty phrase.”).
515 See id. at 318.
516 A Freedom on Trial, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH (Missouri), Jan. 9, 1944, at 36.
517 New High in Censorship, MIAMI NEWS, Jan. 8, 1944, at 4.
518 Wm. T. Evjue, Walker Infringes Press Freedom in Esquire Case, DAILY TRIBUNE
(Wisconsin), Jan. 5, 1944, at 4.
519 Esquire Banned, supra note 377, at 46.
520 Editorial, One-Man Censor, MARSHALL NEWS MESSENGER (Texas), Jan. 4, 1944, at 4.
521 Evjue, supra note 518, at 4.
522 See infra notes 523–38 and accompanying text.
523 Dorothy Thompson, Walker’s Ruling on Esquire, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1944, at 4.
524 Id.
525 Book Burning Next?, NEWS LEADER (Virginia), Apr. 25, 1944, at 4.
526 Esquire Wins By Losing, LEWISBURG JOURNAL (Pennsylvania), Aug. 3, 1944, at 6.
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had a law against anything contrary to the public interest.”527 Representative Ranulf
Compton, a Republican from Connecticut, feared that the ruling would be “a blow to
morale . . . to the boys abroad . . . .”528 “Most of them get a real laugh and a smile . . .
from Esquire and, human nature being what it is, Postmaster General Walker had
better look out lest the service boys blitz him along with [the Japanese].”529 Compton
alleged that he had received mail from soldiers overseas thanking him for sticking
up for Esquire;530 to them, the Varga girl was “a symbol of things left behind.”531
Leaders of various religious denominations spoke out, sympathizing with Walker’s
desire to get rid of “dirty magazines” but deploring his heavy-handed methods.532 Mili-
tary leaders and personnel registered vehement protests.533 The usually staid Army and
Navy Register editorialized that “[t]he men in the foxholes, rather than ‘well-fed’
Washington bureaucrats, should decide whether the Varga girl is lascivious and ob-
scene.”534 One private in the Women’s Air Corps alleged that a number of WACs
were against the ban “because the Varga girl is not really vulgar in this day and age, and
it seems like an infringement of the freedom of the press.”535 “Most people will proba-
bly resent the arbitrary manner in which the decision was handed down . . . if one peri-
odical can be banned in that fashion, we can expect others to get the same treatment.”536
Predictably, the most vocal critics of the ruling were members of the press. For the
nation’s newspaper, book, and magazine publishers, the Esquire case had gone be-
yond the question of “smut v. good, clean fun” and had taken on an existential, life-or-
death quality.537 Editor and Publisher, the respected trade journal and preeminent
527 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 308.
528 Ban on Esquire Termed As Blow to War Morale, CIN. ENQUIRER (Ohio), Jan. 1, 1944, at 5.
529 Id.
530 90 CONG. REC. A118 (1944).
531 Who Doesn’t? . . . Soldiers Want Varga Girl, NEOSHO DAILY NEWS (Missouri), Feb. 8,
1944, at 2.
532 See Postmaster General Penalizes Esquire, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 12, 1944, at 37
(opining that “the whole system of passing on mailing privileges needs ventilation and
revision”).
533 See Army, Navy Register Defends Varga Girl, ST. LOUIS STAR & TIMES (Missouri),
Nov. 27, 1943, at 2; Right to Vote is Preferred to Varga Girl, PITT. PRESS (Pennsylvania),
Jan. 5, 1944, at 5.
534 Army, Navy Register Defends Varga Girl, supra note 533, at 2.
535 Right to Vote is Preferred to Varga Girl, supra note 533, at 5.
536 Peggy Weekly, She Says:, STAR TRIBUNE (Minnesota), Jan. 5, 1944, at 11. Zechariah
Chafee, longtime critic of Milwaukee Leader, denounced Walker’s order, declaring that the work
of “raising morals” was not the “function of government officials, especially in the Post Office.
Should the Postmaster General take over the work of churches and schools and critics of life?
Is a system of regulating a great business activity like the Post Office a mechanism well adapted
to the task of moral elevation?” The “‘public good’ test” was frighteningly vague and subjective;
“the only yardstick” of measurement is “in somebody’s mind.” CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND
MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 307, 312–13.
537 Esquire Banned, supra note 377, at 46.
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voice of the press, urged Esquire to “press their case to a final decision, so that not
within the memory of this generation will another Postmaster General assume to
reject any publication on such flimsy grounds as those Mr. Walker announced.”538
The press had “better stand up and fight,” warned the Daily News, or it will “cease
to be a free press.”539
So pressing was the issue that literary, publishing and journalism organizations
called emergency conferences to draft resolutions against Walker’s order.540 The
Authors’ League declared that censorship by a sole appointed official was “intolera-
ble in the American scene.”541 The Montgomery Bucks Pennsylvania Newspaper
Association pronounced, “Be it resolved, that . . . the Postmaster General . . . has
arrogated to himself a potential control over the printed word in the United States
as absolute as that exercised by any dictator in Europe.”542 Its members resolved “to
take [any and all] such action as it deems right and proper to render abortive the
action by the Postmaster General in his effort to destroy freedom of the press. . . .”543
A. The First Appeal
In the first week of January 1944, as the press roared with condemnations,
Esquire’s lawyers filed papers in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia
seeking to have Walker’s order invalidated on the grounds that the decision was arbi-
trary and capricious, clearly erroneous in light of the evidence introduced at trial and
the hearing board’s conclusions.544 Shortly afterwards, Alfred Smart sent a letter to
ACLU staff counsel Clifford Forster acknowledging the organization’s offer of assis-
tance in an appeal.545 Harding wrote personally to Forster expressing his hope that
the organization would submit an amicus curiae brief as “I anticipate many organi-
zations and publishers are going to do this and it should have its influence with the
Court.”546 Two weeks later, Esquire’s lawyers filed a supplemental complaint alleging
that the order was not only arbitrary and capricious but also unconstitutional in that it
538 Ruling Against Esquire Hit By Editor and Publisher in Commenting Editorially, supra
note 508, at 3.
539 Esquire Barred From the Mails, DAILY NEWS, Jan. 1, 1944, at 9.
540 See, e.g., Brief of the Pennsylvania Newspaper Publishers Association as Amicus Curiae,
Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015 (1944) (No. 22822) [hereinafter Pennsylvania News-
paper Brief].
541 Brief, Authors’ Guild, Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015 (1944).
542 Pennsylvania Newspaper Brief, supra note 540, app. at 13.
543 Id.
544 Plaintiff’s Brief, Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015 (1944) (No. 22822).
545 Letter From Alfred Smart to Clifford Forster (Jan. 19, 1944), in 2548 AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION PAPERS 87, Princeton University (microfilm, University of Washington).
546 Letter from John Harding to Clifford Forster (Jan. 29, 1944), in 2548 AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION PAPERS 88, Princeton University (microfilm, University of Washington).
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amounts to an “unlawful interference with, and abridgement and denial of, the freedom
of the press.”547 According to the magazine PM, this shift in tactics was a response
to Walker’s repeated insistence that because the second-class mail was an “extraor-
dinary privilege,” Esquire had not been deprived of its First Amendment rights.548
Since the 1930s, major newspaper and magazine publishers and their highly
active trade association the American Newspaper Publishers Association had inter-
vened in important freedom of the press cases, particularly at the appellate level.549
The free press principles involved in the Esquire litigation, not to mention its po-
tentially enormous financial consequences for the press, led publishers, journalism
interest groups, and trade organizations to file amicus briefs with the district court.
As most mainstream newspapers were not concerned with having their privileges
revoked for obscenity, the publishers’ briefs focused on the implications of Walker’s
order for political censorship of the press. Noted the American Newspaper Publish-
ers Association, “[s]ince the turn of the century, no President ha[d] named as
Postmaster General any person who did not actively participate in the campaign for
the successful nominee.”550
Esquire’s brief and the ACLU’s amicus brief made arguments based on statutory
interpretation, administrative law, and constitutional law.551 They claimed that Walker’s
interpretation of the fourth condition was contrary to the history and purpose of the
Classification Act, which had been intended to distinguish periodicals from advertise-
ments, rather than to authorize inquiries into the quality of publications.552 Walker’s
“novel and unwarranted” construction of the fourth condition as a morals test or
badge of good character had never been adopted or suggested by any previous
Postmaster General.553
The ACLU and Esquire also alleged that Walker’s reading of the statute violated
the First Amendment by giving the Postmaster General “despotic powers of control
over access to the mails.”554 Since questions of fundamental rights were at issue, they
argued, Walker’s conclusion was not entitled to the deferential review usually attached
to administrative findings.555 The rationale for judicial deference to administrators
547 Charles A. Michie, That Varga Maiden Becomes A Freedom-of-the-Press Issue, PM,
Feb. 18 1944.
548 See id.
549 For a detailed look at the history and actions of the American Newspaper Publishers
Association, see EDWIN EMERY, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS ASSO-
CIATION (1950).
550 Brief of the American Newspaper Publishers’ Association As Amicus Curiae at 3–4,
Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015 (1944) (No. 22822).
551 See infra notes 552–71 and accompanying text.
552 See Brief on Behalf of the American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae, Esquire,
Inc. v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015 (1944) (No. 22822) [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
553 Id. at 2.
554 Id.
555 ACLU Brief, supra note 552, at 36.
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was administrators’ presumed expertise in their field; the Postmaster General did not
have special expertise in “evaluating the literary or other merits of publications.”556
The ACLU urged the court to reject the privilege doctrine on which Walker based
his order.557 Though it admitted that the order could be reversed on the grounds that
the Postmaster General exercised authority not conferred by the statute, it urged the
court to “take this opportunity to reassess broadly the validity of the ‘privilege
doctrine.’”558 The doctrine was a “constitutional anachronism,” in clear violation of
the new judicial outlook on First Amendment rights.559 The ACLU reminded the
court of the Supreme Court’s “recent vigilance to protect individual speech,” the
“active judicial enforcement” of civil liberties in the past twenty-five years “to pro-
tect the public’s interest in the spread, discussion, and evaluation of differing points
of view.”560 Channeling Holmes and Brandeis, they asserted that the power of the Post
Office Department must be limited by modern First Amendment doctrines, includ-
ing the clear and present danger test.561 The proper view of the relationship of the
postal power and the First Amendment was stated in the dissents of Holmes and
Brandeis in the Milwaukee Leader case.562
B. The Traditions of Our People
T. Whitfield Davidson, a “hard-headed and dead-pan” 69-year-old judge, heard
Esquire’s appeal.563 Davidson usually sat on the U.S. District Court in Texas but had
been temporarily assigned to the District of Columbia bench.564 In his temperament
and moral outlook, he was the spitting image of Frank Walker.565
Davidson was, in the words of writer Hugh Merrill, an “American classic.”566 Born
in a log cabin in East Texas Hills in 1876, he studied history, law, and the Bible by
firelight while he made a living splitting rails.567 With almost no formal education,
he was admitted to the bar in 1903, was later elected to the state senate, and served
as lieutenant governor of Texas.568 In 1936, he was appointed to the federal bench
by President Roosevelt.569
556 Id.
557 See id. at 38 (“[Walker’s] order should be held invalid and the revocation of plaintiff’s
second class mail entry enjoined.”).
558 Id. at 4.
559 See id. at 3–12.
560 Id. at 4–5, 7.
561 See id. at 12.
562 Id. at 19.
563 That Wasn’t No Lady, supra note 425, at 84, 86.
564 MERRILL, supra note 373, at 115.
565 See infra notes 566–617 and accompanying text.
566 MERRILL, supra note 373, at 115.
567 T. Whitfield Davidson Dead, Senior Federal Judge Was 97, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1974,
at 49.
568 Id.
569 Id.
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During the oral arguments, Bruce Bromley was again in fine form. Bromley
brought into the courtroom stacks of pulp magazines such as I Did it for Love, and
I Married a Fiend in an attempt to convince the judge that Esquire was far more
benign than other publications that held the second-class privilege.570 “[This is] the
type of book[ ] we try to keep from our children, yet it goes through the mail,” said
Bromley, waving the magazines in the air.571 Davidson thumbed through the issues
without comment.572 Bromley described Walker’s actions as “the most autocratic
control that any public official ever assumed for himself.”573 Benedict Deinard,
Justice Department Counsel, emphasized that the magazine’s real purpose was the
circulation of “nude women and salacious cartoons” and that the literary material
was just a filler.574 “Waving a January issue with the familiar Varga girl . . . [he]
shouted, ‘Is that what Congress [issued] a bounty for?’”575
Three weeks later, Davidson upheld Walker’s order.576 Davidson concluded that
there was no justification for interference with Walker’s decision.577 Citing Milwaukee
Leader, Davidson asserted that “[t]he conclusion of [the] head of an executive depart-
ment [on] a matter of fact within his jurisdiction [should] not be disturbed. . . unless
[it was] clearly wrong.”578 The revocation of Esquire’s permit was neither arbitrary
nor capricious, since many other magazines had lost their permits for similar rea-
sons.579 According to the judge’s flawed reasoning, an arbitrary or capricious act
became less so when it was applied to a large number of parties.
The bulk of the opinion addressed Walker’s interpretation of the second-class
statute.580 In a laudable but ultimately pathetic effort at historical recreation, Davidson
attempted to determine the purpose of the Classification Act by “envision[ing] as far
as possible the things [the drafters of the law] saw and the emotions that [they]
felt.”581 What was contemplated by Congress when it issued the qualification was
that “[t]he publication must be originated and published for the dissemination of
information of a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences, arts, or some
special industry.”582 Congress, he concluded, “had a purpose.”583
570 Esquire Fights for Mail Rights, DES MOINES REGISTER, July 11, 1944, at 3.
571 Id.
572 Id.
573 Id.
574 That Wasn’t No Lady, supra note 425, at 86.
575 Id.
576 See generally Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 F. Supp. 1015 (1944).
577 See id. at 1022 (holding there was “no logical ground to enjoin [Walker’s] action”).
578 Id. at 1016–17.
579 Id. at 1021–22.
580 Justice Davidson begins by examining the statutory language and then proceeds to at-
tempt to determine Congress’s frame of mind when passing the Act. See id. at 1017–19.
581 Id. at 1018.
582 Id.
583 Id.
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In 1879, when the statute was drafted, “the nation was in the midst of what may
be known as the Victorian era . . . under the then living influences of men like
Lincoln, Lee and William McGuffey.”584 William McGuffey, the chair of moral
philosophy in the University of Virginia, was famous for his McGuffey’s Readers,
a series of textbooks, used in elementary schools throughout the country, that attempted
to impart moral lessons along with basic reading skills.585 The McGuffey’s Readers
were renowned for their platitudes—“[one] must be honest and just . . . revere and
respect his parents”—and their homespun parables, such as the famous myth of
George Washington telling the truth after cutting down a cherry tree.586
It was men “brought up under [such] ethics and standards” who wrote the Clas-
sification Act, according to Davidson587:
May the Postmaster General, therefore, have not been warranted
in reaching his conclusions that the literature referred to was
literature of desirable type of an educational value? The Post-
master General had to make his conclusions. He had to test the
contents of the magazine by some standard.588
. . . .
[W]e conclude that the Postmaster General was warranted in taking
the view that Congress meant for second class mail to be a contri-
bution toward public education and therefore, that the literature
given such low rate should possess merit and be of educational
value. The defendant Walker has some basis for his findings in
the nation’s background and the traditions of our people.589
Davidson brushed off the suggestion that Esquire’s First Amendment rights had
been violated; the magazine was still able to circulate, albeit at higher rates, he
noted.590 The judge rejected the characterization of Walker’s order as “censorship.”591
In deeming Esquire “not of a public character,” Walker had not censored it, but
rather “group[ed]” and “classif[ied]” it, Davidson wrote.592 “There is a very decided
584 Id.
585 See id. at 1018–19. For a history of the McGuffey Readers, see HENRY H. VAIL, A HIS-
TORY OF THE MCGUFFEY READERS (1911).
586 See Esquire, 55 F. Supp. at 1019.
587 Id.
588 Id. at 1019.
589 Id. at 1020.
590 See id. at 1020 (noting that Esquire had “not been stripped of any vested right” and was
free to apply for reinstatement after complying with the Classification Act).
591 See id. at 1021.
592 Id.
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difference between grouping and classifying and that of censoring. Censoring deals
more with the specific article, the deleting of objectionable portions. Classifying
means grouping.”593
The rambling, confused opinion collapsed into a terse conclusion:
Having thus in good faith performed the duty of his office as he
saw it, we find no logical ground to enjoin his action, or stated
otherwise, no valid, legal basis can be had for the substitution of
the court’s views for those of the executive officer. His findings
like those of the Master or the Jury must be upheld by the
court.594
“Tyranny and Esquire” thundered Colliers’ magazine.595 The decision “savors . . .
of dictatorial government, such as Hitler exemplified in suppressing in Germany all
publications that presented information not in accord with the Nazi philosophy,”
wrote the Hartford Courant.596 If the Esquire case were to set a precedent, “politi-
cians will go on from there to extend political control over the press . . . until
presently there will be no paper forums in which any but the views of the party in
power can get a hearing.”597 “Out the window with freedom of the press will go most
[of the] other American liberties.”598 Davidson’s suggestion that the standards for
the second-class mailing privilege should be based on a Victorian-era children’s
primer sparked both mockery and horror.599 If Davidson’s test were to be taken
literally, wrote the New York Times, “the consequences would be picturesque and
perhaps appalling.”600
Esquire appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.601
The ACLU and American Newspaper Publishers Association filed amicus briefs, as
did the Authors’ League of America.602 So intense was the interest in the case that
two major publishing companies filed briefs on behalf of Esquire—the Curtis Pub-
lishing Company and the Reader’s Digest Association, publisher of one of the
593 Id.
594 Id. at 1022.
595 See Tyranny and Esquire, COLLIERS’, Sept. 16, 1944, at 82.
596 The Esquire Decision, 45 READER’S DIGEST 64, 64 (1944) (citing an editorial in the
Hartford Courant).
597 Tyranny and Esquire, supra note 595, at 82.
598 Id.
599 See generally The Case of Esquire, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1944, at 18.
600 Id.
601 See Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (1945).
602 Id. at 53 n.6 (listing Briefs Amicus Curiae filed by the Reader’s Digest Association,
Inc., The Curtis Publishing Company, The American Newspaper Publishers Association, the
ACLU, and the Author’s League of America).
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largest circulation magazines in the country.603 The appeals court heard the case in
the spring of 1945.604
C. The “Preferred Position”
The three years between the start of Walker’s “decency campaign” and the
hearing before the Circuit Court of Appeals were extraordinary ones in the history
of the First Amendment. Scholars have described this period, between 1942–1945,
as the era of the “preferred position” doctrine, in which an influential majority on
the Supreme Court agreed that speech rights merited heightened scrutiny because
of their intimate connection to participatory democracy.605 The Court heard an
unprecedented number of speech cases, often deciding in favor of speech.606 Clear
and present danger became the “all purpose” First Amendment test, and it was
applied to a range of speech restrictions beyond the subversive advocacy context for
which it was originally intended.607 Clear and present danger was used to invalidate
prohibitions on labor picketing, contempt by publication, and restrictions on reli-
gious expression, including compulsory flag salutes.608 A majority of the Court came
to regard clear and present danger as the “touchstone of First Amendment policy.”609
The elevation of speech to a near-sacred position was in many ways the logical
progression of the doctrinal developments of the previous half-decade. It was also
the consequence of a personnel change on the Court. Every seat on the Court changed
occupants between 1937 and 1945.610 Among those to join the Court were a group
of younger justices who formed a liberal bloc—Hugo Black, William Douglas, Frank
Murphy, and Wiley Rutledge.611 This new generation regarded Holmes and Brandeis
(who had resigned in 1935 and 1939, respectively) “with veneration,” and sought
to make their positions on the First Amendment law.612 Harlan Stone, a staunch
protector of civil liberties who had been on the Court since the early 1930s, was
appointed Chief Justice in 1941.613
603 Judge Thurman Arnold, who would write the Circuit Court’s opinion in the Esquire case,
observed that the issue was causing “genuine anxiety in our most respectable publishing
circles.” Id.
604 Esquire, 151 F.2d at 49.
605 See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Preferred Position
Debate, 1941–1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 39 (1987).
606 See, e.g., cases cited infra note 614; see also Currie, supra note 605 (discussing addi-
tional influential First Amendment cases heard by the Supreme Court during the “preferred
position” era).
607 See KALVEN, supra note 207, at 180.
608 See id.
609 Id. at 179.
610 Id.
611 Id.
612 Id.
613 See id.
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The most important First Amendment cases heard by the Court involved chal-
lenges by Jehovah’s Witnesses against the efforts of municipalities to limit the group’s
proselytizing activities. Decisions in the “Jehovah’s Witness cases” broadened the
range of First Amendment protected expression to include such activities as door-to-
door leafleting, handing out religious pamphlets on the street, and playing phono-
graph records with religious messages.614 In Lovell v. Griffin,615 a unanimous Court
declared a licensing law that required a permit from the city in order to distribute
religious pamphlets to be an infringement on “liberty of circulation,”616 which was
the “very life blood of a free press.”617 In the Jehovah’s Witness cases, the Court also
extended the rationales for the protection of free speech beyond society’s interest in
“public discussion.”618 The First Amendment protects not only the public’s interest in
dialogue for the purpose of self-governance, but the liberty of the individual to foster
and express his or her own personal beliefs—“freedom of the individual to be vocal
or silent according to his conscience or personal inclination,” particularly in matters
of religious faith.619 Wrote Justice Roberts for a unanimous Court in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,620 supporting the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses to exercise nonviolent
criticism of the Catholic Church, “the essential characteristic” of freedom of speech
and freedom of religion was that “under their shield many types of life, character,
opinion, and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed.”621
Members of the Court frequently invoked the specter of totalitarianism to justify
limiting the police power to protect the First Amendment rights of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses.622 Freedom of conscience, freedom of thought, and freedom to communicate
to others were described as weapons against tyrannical government.623 Forced speech
and thought were the hallmarks of dictatorship, wrote Justice Robert Jackson in his ma-
jority opinion in West Virginia v. Barnette,624 striking down a law, aimed at the Jeho-
vah’s Witnesses, that compelled students to salute the flag on threat of expulsion
from school.625 “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
614 West Virginia St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsyl-
vania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Minersville
Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell
v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
615 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
616 Id. at 452.
617 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 616 (1942).
618 See cases cited supra note 614.
619 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
620 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
621 Id. at 310.
622 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 614.
623 See infra notes 624–45 and accompanying text.
624 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
625 Id. at 642.
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no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.”626 “Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
unanimity of the graveyard.”627
The “preferred position” doctrine was not absolutism. In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,628 a unanimous Court made clear that First Amendment rights applied
only to speech within protected categories.629 Chaplinsky upheld the conviction of
a Jehovah’s Witness arrested under a breach of peace law for uttering “fighting
words”—speech with the likelihood of provoking imminent violence.630 Chaplinsky
designated fighting words, obscenity, and libel outside the scope of the First
Amendment, explaining that “such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.”631 Even the most speech-protective justices agreed that the First Amend-
ment did not protect all expression, and that lines could be validly drawn.
In the fifteen years between Near v. Minnesota and the Esquire case, the Court
had done substantial work articulating a doctrinal structure for the First Amendment,
as well as philosophical rationales for the constitutional protection of speech. Im-
plicitly and explicitly, the Court had designated political dissent and expressions of
religious belief to be at the “core” of the First Amendment’s free speech protections
because of their essential connection to self-governance, and to the democratic ideal
of personal autonomy in matters of conscience and faith.632 “Low-value” speech
such as obscenity and libel did not contribute to public discussion or worthwhile
self-expression and could be validly regulated under the police power.633 The Court
had yet to determine the level of scrutiny that applied between the First Amend-
ment’s core and its periphery. Freedom of expression protected both collective and
individual goals: society’s right to receive and discuss information for the purpose
of public discussion, and the autonomy of individuals to choose what they would
believe and utter—“intellectual individualism”634 and “freedom of the mind.”635 The
Esquire case, with its unique set of facts, would give the Court the opportunity to
develop and fine-tune these rationales and distinctions.
626 Id.
627 Id. at 641.
628 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
629 See id. at 571–72 (noting that speech that is “lewd and obscene, . . . profane, . . .
libelous, . . . insulting or ‘fighting’ words” does not enjoy the same heightened protection).
630 Id. at 569, 574.
631 Id. at 572.
632 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
633 See Chaplinsky, 316 U.S. at 571–72.
634 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
635 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 605 (1940).
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VII. THE MOST IMPORTANT OPINION ON CENSORSHIP SINCE ULYSSES
Bruce Bromley argued the Esquire case before the Circuit Court of Appeals in
April 1945,636 just weeks before Nazi Germany’s surrender to the Allies.637 Bromley’s
audience consisted of Judges Justin Miller, Henry Edgerton, and Thurman Arnold.638
Arnold wrote the opinion overturning the District Court’s decision and restoring the
magazine’s second-class privileges.639 The opinion was heralded as a free speech
landmark.640 Short on formal reasoning but long on wit and invective, it reflected the
character and temperament of the iconoclastic judge, remembered for his wit, disdain
for pomposity, and a personality described as equal parts “Voltaire and the cowboy.”641
A. Thurman Arnold
Thurman Arnold was one of the legal giants of his time, a “towering figure[ ]
[in] twentieth century American law.”642 Arnold achieved success in an impressive
array of endeavors; in addition to his position on the federal court, he served as mayor,
state legislator, small-town law practitioner, law dean, Yale law professor, and
Assistant Attorney General of the United States.643
Like Frank Walker and Judge T. Whitfield Davidson, Arnold hailed from humble
roots. Arnold grew up in Laramie, Wyoming around the turn of the century.644 After
attending Princeton and obtaining a law degree from Harvard, he established a prosper-
ous law practice in Laramie, then left to become dean of the University of West
Virginia Law School.645 Three years later he accepted an appointment to the law faculty
at Yale University.646 Arnold soon became known as a leader of legal realism, the new
movement that aimed to create a pragmatic science of the law.647 Arnold was appointed
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice in 1938,648 which was credited with single-handedly reviving antitrust as a
means of regulating industry.649 Within three years the Department of Justice had
636 See Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
637 The Potsdam Conference, 1945, OFF. HIST., https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937
-1945/potsdam-conf [http://perma.cc/34UL-G53Z].
638 See Esquire, 151 F.2d at 49.
639 See id. at 49–50.
640 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Short Unhappy Judgeship of Thurman Arnold, 3 WYO.
L. REV. 233, 250 (2003).
641 See id. at 234 n.1, 249–50.
642 Id. at 233.
643 Id.
644 Id. at 235.
645 Id. at 235, 237.
646 Id. at 237.
647 Id. at 238.
648 PAULA K. BYERS ET AL., Thurman Arnold, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY
314 (2d ed. 1998).
649 Waller, supra note 640, at 234.
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instituted more antitrust prosecutions than it had in the half century since the 1890
passage of the Sherman Act.650 Arnold’s enforcement decisions upset both the industries
he attacked and their supporters within the Roosevelt administration, and he was pres-
sured to resign from the Department of Justice in 1943.651 Later that year, he was ap-
pointed associate justice of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.652
Arnold was brilliant, but his personality was not suited for judging. He recalled in
his memoirs that his “preference for partisan argument, rather than for impartial de-
cision” made him dissatisfied with his career on the appellate court.653 He doubted
whether a person of his temperament could ever contribute to the bench: “I was im-
patient with legal precedents that seemed to me to reach an unjust result. I felt restricted
by the fact that a judge has no business writing or speaking on controversial sub-
jects.”654 Judging grew intolerable and Arnold left the bench in 1945, weeks after he
issued the Esquire opinion.655 Arnold’s decision to part with the judiciary “opened
the door to his later . . . success as . . . a private practitioner . . . and defender of civil
liberties,” representing the innocent victims of anticommunist hysteria during the early
years of the Cold War.656
B. Neither Snow Nor Rain
Arnold’s opinion in the Esquire case was widely acclaimed as his most impressive
judicial opinion.657 It was called a “masterpiece on government censorship”658 and a
triumph of freedom of the press.659 The editors of the Saturday Review of Literature
called Arnold’s ruling “the most important American legal opinion on censorship since
the Ulysses decision in 1933” and reprinted it in its June 16, 1945, issue.660 The Arizona
Daily Star described the ruling as one of “major importance” “[i]n a world which
is today suffering the terrific pains of the hangover from dictatorial controls in many
lands.”661 Arnold was lauded as “a champion of civil liberties,” and many important
figures in the literary and civil liberties communities, including H.L. Mencken, met
with him personally to thank him for his ringing endorsement of free expression.662
650 See id. at 241.
651 See id.
652 Id. at 242.
653 Id. at 251.
654 Id.
655 See id. at 250.
656 Id. at 234.
657 See id. at 248–49.
658 Id. at 248.
659 Id. at 250.
660 Jean Preer, Esquire v. Walker: The Postmaster General and “The Magazine for Men”
Part 3, 23 NAT’L ARCHIVES (1990).
661 The Esquire Opinion, ARIZONA DAILY STAR, June 11, 1945, at 14.
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Though passionate and rhetorically appealing, as a work of legal analysis, Arnold’s
Esquire opinion was deeply flawed. It is better characterized as a petulant commen-
tary on the evils of censorship, an editorial column, or a personal hate letter to Frank
Walker. Sophisticated, witty, and urbane, Arnold had little tolerance for “prudes,”
and he had no qualms about using the opinion as a vehicle for his personal views.
Drafts of the opinion in Arnold’s personal papers reveal that he was even more
forthright in early versions of the opinion but was persuaded by his colleagues to
tone down his invective.663 In his memoirs, Arnold recognized that the opinion was
“frivolous,” and a testament to his difficulties with judging.664 The Esquire opinion,
Arnold wrote, showed that “an advocate cannot make a dignified judge.”665
The gist of the opinion was that the Classification Act did not grant the Postmas-
ter General authority to make determinations about the content of publications
seeking second-class status.666 Arnold offered no discussion of the statute’s purpose
or history to support this, instead simply declaring, “[it] is inconceivable that Congress
intended to delegate such power to an administrative official or that the exercise of
such power, if delegated, could be held constitutional.”667 In a footnote, he cited sev-
eral of the Supreme Court’s recent free speech cases as supporting “broad princi-
ples” that made that conclusion “inescapable.”668 Referencing Holmes’s dissent in
Abrams v. United States, he noted that the “American way” of obtaining a contribu-
tion to the public good was by giving opportunity to the purveyors of different view-
points to compete in the marketplace of ideas, not “compelling conformity to the
taste or ideas of any government official.”669
Arnold rejected the privilege doctrine,670 but offered no constitutional rationale
for doing so. He described Walker’s characterization of second-class mailing rates
as “unique privileges” as an “extraordinary contention.”671 Quipped Arnold:
He appears to think of his duty under the statute, not as administra-
tion of nondiscriminatory rates for a public service, but as analo-
gous to the award of the Navy E for industrial contributions to
the war. The Navy E is an award for exceptional merit. The
second-class mailing rate is conceived by the Post Office to be
663 See notes in Esquire v. Walker Folder, Thurman Arnold Papers, University of Wyoming.
664 See THURMAN ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL: A DISSENTING LAWYER’S LIFE 170
(1965).
665 Id. at 160.
666 See generally Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 151 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
667 Id. at 50.
668 Id. at 50 n.2.
669 Id. at 50–51.
670 See id. at 51.
671 Id.
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an award for resisting the temptation to publish material which
offends persons of refinement.
But mail service is not a special privilege. It is a highway over
which all business must travel. The rates charged on this high-
way must not discriminate between competing businesses of the
same kind. If the Interstate Commerce Commission were dele-
gated the power to give lower rates to such manufacturers as in
its judgment were contributing to the public good the exercise of
that power would be clearly unconstitutional. Such a situation
would involve freedom of competitive enterprise. The case before
us involves freedom of speech as well.672
The remainder of the opinion was devoted to reprinting humorous and embarras-
sing segments of the hearing transcript to mock the Post Office Department officials
and their parade of prudish witnesses.673 Wrote Arnold:
[S]ince we hope that this is the last time that a government agency
will attempt to compel the acceptance of its literary or moral
standards relating to material admittedly not obscene, the volu-
minous record may serve as a useful reminder of the kind of
mental confusion which always accompanies such censorship.674
The opinion quoted parts of the exchange between Bruce Bromley and Mrs. Harvey
Wiley over the “obscenity” of swimmer Annette Kellerman, the colorful testimony
of H.L. Mencken, and the colloquy between Bromley and the Post Office Depart-
ment counsel:
Mr. Bromley: I would like to know, Mr. Hassell, if you don’t mind
telling me now, just what it is in that article you don’t like. I can’t
find it.
Mr. Hassell: I would be glad to read it to counsel.
Mr. Bromley: Thank you.
Mr. Hassell: Third column at the bottom of page 144. ‘He noticed
how large the uniform made her behind look.’675
672 Id. at 51–52.
673 See id. at 52–55.
674 Id. at 52.
675 Id. at 53.
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“It may be that the above encourages the use of unscientific terms,” wrote
Arnold676:
Or it may be that it is in the public interest to omit all comment
on the part of the lady referred to. Yet it is difficult to make such
judgments with the feeling of certainty which one should have
when the result of one’s decision is to cost a publication
$500,000 annually.677
The limitless power claimed by Walker would be used to “bind modern periodical
literature to the standards of a former generation.”678
The concluding paragraph took the final jab:
We intend no criticism of counsel for the Post Office. They were
faced with an impossible task. They undertook it with sincerity.
But their very sincerity makes the record useful as a memorial to
commemorate the utter confusion and lack of intelligible standards
which can never be escaped when that task is attempted. We be-
lieve that the Post Office officials should experience a feeling of re-
lief if they are limited to the more prosaic function of seeing to it
that “neither snow nor rain nor heat nor gloom of night stays these
couriers from the swift completion of their appointed rounds.”679
By then, Frank Walker had left the position.680 He had resigned two months earlier
to allow Harry Truman, who assumed the Presidency in April, to appoint his own
candidate.681 Robert Hannegan, chairman of the Democratic National Committee,
was sworn into the position on June 30, 1945.682 A little over a month later, the
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought an end to the war in the Pacific.683
VIII. HANNEGAN V. ESQUIRE
The Esquire case could have ended right there. Both sides, however, recognized
the difficulty of concluding the case with the Circuit Court’s decision. Arnold’s
676 Id.
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679 Id. at 55.
680 Frank C. Walker (1945), MILLER CENTER, https://millercenter.org/president/truman/es
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vague and muddled opinion left the Post Office Department with an uncertain
understanding of its authority to limit second-class mailing privileges,684 and Esquire
and its supporters recognized that the privilege doctrine was still the law of the land
unless the Supreme Court reversed Milwaukee Leader.
In September 1945, the Department of Justice filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari, asking the Court to determine the power of Congress and the Post Office
Department to limit the use of the second-class privilege.685 Its brief asserted that
Arnold’s decision had left the Post Office Department “at sea” and cast doubts on
the constitutionality of potential future legislation to limit second-class privileges.686
In particular, the government sought clarification as to whether it was the Postmaster
General’s duty to determine whether a publication satisfied the fourth criterion of
the Classification Act.687
The ACLU filed an amicus brief supporting the government’s request. It criti-
cized Arnold’s opinion as “proceed[ing] on the level of moral instruction rather than
constitutional argument,” and consequently doing “little to settle the vexing and im-
portant question of how far Congress has gone or may constitutionally go in vesting
in the Postmaster General the power to allocate differential postal rates to periodicals
in light of his judgment as to their literary merits or moral correctness.”688 Though
it believed Arnold’s ruling should be sustained, the ACLU urged the Court to “take
[the] opportunity to clarify the important constitutional questions . . . and to review
the positions expressed . . . twenty-four years ago in [Milwaukee Leader].”689 The
second-class revocation—“a brutally effective, albeit an indirect, previous restraint
on freedom of circulation”—must be reconsidered in light of “more recent pronounce-
ments in other civil liberties cases.”690
The importance of the constitutional and legal questions, the public’s fascination
with the proceedings, and the high-profile briefs by prominent interest groups and pub-
lishing houses virtually ensured that the Court would take the case. On October 22,
1945, the Court granted certiorari because of the “importance of the problem in the ad-
ministration of the postal laws.”691 Oral argument was set for the following January.692
Given the egregious facts, the composition of the Supreme Court, and the tenor
of its recent First Amendment rulings, there was no possible outcome other than a
684 See David Lawrence, Need for High Court to Reverse Mail Privilege Decision Cited,
ARIZONA REPUB., June 7, 1945, at 14.
685 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1945)
(No. 399).
686 Id. at 8.
687 See id. at 2.
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victory for Esquire. Whether the Court would take up the invitation to overrule
Milwaukee Leader, and where it would set the boundary between the postal power
and the First Amendment, were open questions.
A. A Vigorous and Independent Press
Briefs were filed in the fall of 1945.693 The same publishing groups and compa-
nies that had presented amicus briefs to the Court of Appeals also filed briefs with
the Supreme Court.694 They were joined by a very distinguished party—the Bill of
Rights Committee of the American Bar Association, an elite group of lawyers and
academics, including Zechariah Chafee.695 Many members of the Committee were
conservative in their political orientation, and the group also had a conservative
approach to its involvement in civil liberties litigation.696 Distinguishing itself from
the ACLU and its far-reaching involvement on behalf of a range of issues and clients,
the Committee lent its name and expertise sparingly, only when it believed that
questions of fundamental constitutional importance were involved, and “convinced
that real assistance can be given the courts in arriving at a correct conclusion.”697 The
Committee’s intervention in the Esquire case was a testament not only to the per-
ceived magnitude of the issues but also how uncontroversial they were. Like the
ACLU, the Bill of Rights Committee believed that Arnold’s decision was correct but
sought to place the ruling on a broader basis than Arnold’s “colorful and hortatory”
opinion.698 It urged the Court to make Brandeis and Holmes’s dissents in Milwaukee
Leader law—to establish “the right of the people to a free press . . . on broad grounds
so that it will never again be threatened by such egregious administrative blunders as
that which this record presents.”699 It noted that it “would be ironical, [if] indeed . . .
after victory in a great war for human freedom, an administrative officer in the United
States were permitted to imperil a free press by such action as he took in this case.”700
Esquire repeated its earlier arguments—that the Post Office Department’s reading
of the statute was contrary to its framers’ intent, and contrary to the First Amend-
ment.701 The Classification Act gave the Postmaster General limited powers of classi-
fication, not the power to deny second-class rates because the content of a periodical
was not in his opinion “good information or good literature or good art.”702 The Post-
master General’s asserted power to discriminate between periodicals based on his
693 See infra notes 694–719 and accompanying text.
694 See Lawrence, supra note 684, at 14.
695 See Report of the Special Committee on Bill of Rights, 70 ANNU. REP. A.B.A. 276 (1945).
696 See id.
697 Id.
698 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief In Support Thereof at 8, Hannegan
v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (No. 399).
699 Id. at 13.
700 Id. at 3.
701 See Brief for Respondents, Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (No. 399).
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“personal likes and dislikes” would reduce the existence of the press “to the whims
and fancies of changing holders of a highly political office.”703 “It is difficult to imagine
any situation, conceivable in this country, which would be less favorable to the con-
tinued development of a vigorous and independent press.”704 The ACLU emphasized
the tyrannical nature of Walker’s actions; if his construction of the statute were
sustained, the Postmaster General would be vested with “despotic . . . control over
access to the mails.”705 Walker’s order violated not only American tradition but
“nearly all the basic rules of civil liberties law that have been laid down by this Court
in interpreting the guarantees of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”706
B. Oral Argument
Oral argument was held before eight justices on January 11, 1946.707 Justice
Jackson was absent, having taken leave of absence to serve as prosecutor in the
Nuremberg trials.708 We do not have a recording or transcript of the argument, although
brief accounts were published in several newspapers.709 Bromley’s argument before the
Court in the Esquire case was considered the finest of his career. According to Justice
Douglas, Bromley—with his easy, relaxed manner of presentation, his knack for “re-
ducing a complicated case to one or two starkly simple issues,” and for illuminating
those issues with “homely illustrations”—was one of the greatest appellate advo-
cates of the time.710
Government attorney Myron Taylor, who had argued the case before the Circuit
Court of Appeals, held up a Varga Girl illustration for the Court’s inspection.711
According to news reports, the justices looked at the picture dispassionately, as if
it “was just another legal brief.”712 The purpose of Esquire, Taylor insisted, was to
“build up circulation by a salacious appeal.”713 “If a publication is filthy, vile, caters
to salacious appetites; if its predominant quality is cheap and degrading and it makes
703 Brief of The American Civil Liberties Union as Amicus Curiae at 24, Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (No. 399).
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fun of chastity, can it be said that a magazine with that editorial policy meets Con-
gressional requirements for the second class mailing privileges?”714
“That purpose was bad,” Taylor repeated.715
“By what standard?” asked Douglas.716
“By the ordinary standards of decent people . . . Cheesecake, leg art and illus-
trated girl gags aren’t literature and aren’t art.”717
Bromley insisted that if the Court upheld Walker’s decision, it would be setting
up the Postmaster General as a censor.718 “Congress had no intention of delegating
‘to the individual who might enjoy the incumbency of the office of Postmaster
General at any particular time, the right to pick and choose according to his personal
taste and moral standards which periodicals were for the public good. . . .’”719
“Walker’s directive was an unconstitutional attempt to abridge freedom of the press
according to his ‘own moral yardstick.’”720
C. Hannegan v. Esquire
By all evidence, the decision was simple. Votes were taken right after the oral ar-
gument, and the opinion was assigned and written within only three weeks.721 The
unanimous, 8–0 decision was issued on February 4, 1946.722 As the Atlanta Constitution
aptly noted, the Court rarely made unanimous rulings, but when it did, “the chances
are that all shades of opinion in the nation are in accord with the decision.”723
The opinion was assigned to Justice William Douglas,724 one of the members of
the Court’s liberal bloc.725 Appointed to the Court by President Roosevelt in 1939,726
a former Yale law professor and Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion,727 Douglas was just beginning to develop and refine his views on freedom of
speech. The Jehovah’s Witness cases728 had been critical in this regard. In several of
those cases, Douglas had joined opinions with other members of the Court’s liberal
714 Id.
715 Drury, supra note 709, at 9.
716 Id.
717 Id.
718 Varga Girl’s Curves Fail To Upset Dignity of Court As Jurists Eye “Leggy” Beauty, supra
note 713, at 1.
719 Id.
720 Drury, supra note 709, at 9.
721 See Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 146 (1946).
722 Id. Justice Jackson took no part in the decision.
723 Bar Is Lifted on Esquire, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 11, 1946, at 8.
724 Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 147.
725 Robert J. McKeever, The Fall and Rise of Judicial Activism in the United States: The
Case of Justice William O. Douglas, 11 J. LEGAL. HIST. 437, 437 (1990).
726 Id.
727 L. A. Powe, Jr., Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First Amendment, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 371, 403 (1974).
728 See cases cited supra note 614.
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bloc stating that freedom of speech and religion were in a “preferred position.”729
The preferred position concept subsequently became the centerpiece of his approach
to judicial review of state actions restricting speech.730 Between 1945 and 1949, ac-
cording to former law clerk Lucas Powe, Douglas’s stance on speech grew increasingly
protective—he “required a showing of significant danger to an important govern-
mental interest before he would authorize any interference with expression.”731 The
Esquire decision was a milestone in this development. Esquire signaled “Douglas’
growing [enthusiasm] to protect freedom of speech and the press over [nearly any]
asserted federal interests to the contrary.”732 According to Powe, Hannegan v. Esquire
marked the emergence of a “new Douglas” on freedom of speech.733
The opinion, which drew heavily on Esquire’s brief and Bromley’s oral argu-
ment, affirmed Arnold’s decision.734 The Court concluded that the Postmaster General
had incorrectly interpreted the fourth condition and that the second-class privilege
had never been intended as a merit badge for publications.735 Walker’s plan to use
the fourth condition as a cleansing tool for the nation’s mails had been quashed,736
and the press averted what could have been a restriction. While vindicating Esquire,
the holding was at the same time more limited than the magazine or its supporters
wanted it to be. The Court did not overrule Milwaukee Leader and the privilege doc-
trine.737 It did not take up the invitation to define, with specificity, the First Amend-
ment’s restrictions on the Post Office Department’s authority, or the extent of the
Postmaster General’s power to revoke or deny second-class mailing privileges outside
of the fourth condition of the Classification Act.738 The holding was technically not
based on the First Amendment, but rather on statutory interpretation, although the
Court’s reading of the statute was influenced by First Amendment principles.739
It is in the delineation of those principles that the opinion in Hannegan v. Esquire
breaks new ground. Douglas’s opinion reiterated recurring themes and rationales in
the Court’s recent free speech decisions: the importance of the freedom to circulate
729 Leon D. Epstein, Justice Douglas and Civil Liberties, 1951 WIS. L. REV. 125, 127.
730 See id.
731 Powe, supra note 727, at 384.
732 Id. at 385.
733 Id.
734 See generally Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946).
735 See id. at 156–58.
736 See id.
737 For discussion of Milwaukee Leader and the privilege doctrine, see discussion supra
Section II.C. The Court in Hannegan focused its analysis on the revocation of second-class
mailing rates under the Fourth condition of the Classification Act of 1879, distinguishing the
case from the revocation in Milwaukee Leader. See Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 148.
738 See Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 148 (focusing the analysis on the fourth condition of the
Classification Act).
739 See CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 301 (“[T]he
First Amendment did play a part in the Esquire case by shaping the Court’s views of what the
fourth condition in the statute really required.”).
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ideas to democratic dialogue and “public discussion”; censorship and paternalistic
restrictions on speech as hallmarks of tyranny and totalitarianism; and freedom of
thought, conscience, and choice as essential rights of individuals.740 At the same time,
the Esquire opinion extended those commitments in novel and forward-looking ways.
It is in Douglas’s musings, especially in dicta, on the scope and spirit of freedom of
speech that the Esquire opinion opened up new horizons and made important con-
tributions to the law and theory of free expression.
The opinion began by recounting Esquire’s path through the agency hearings
and Esquire’s subsequent appeals.741 Douglas characterized Esquire as specializing
in a “smoking-room type of humor” and noted the inconclusive nature of the Post
Office Department hearings as to the magazine’s obscenity.742
Douglas then turned to Walker’s revocation order.743 Douglas did not mince words:
Walker had censored Esquire and his deployment of the fourth condition was a pretext
to cut off Esquire because he thought the magazine was “bad.”744 Such arbitrary exer-
cises of authority were antithetical to democracy and the American tradition:
An examination of the items makes plain, we think, that the con-
troversy is not whether the magazine publishes “information of
a public character” or is devoted to “literature” or to the “arts.” It
is whether the contents are “good” or “bad.” To uphold the order
of revocation would, therefore, grant the Postmaster General a
power of censorship. Such a power is so abhorrent to our tradi-
tions that a purpose to grant it should not be easily inferred.745
Douglas devoted the majority of the opinion to an analysis of the history and
purpose of the Classification Act.746 Douglas reiterated that the Postmaster General’s
authority under the Act was merely to determine whether a publication was a peri-
odical rather than an advertisement; it did not authorize inquiries into the social
value of a magazine.747 The framers of the Classification Act and the Post Office
Department officials that later interpreted it “plainly adopted a strictly objective test
and left no discretion to the postal authorities to withhold the second-class privilege
from a mailable newspaper or periodical because it failed to meet some standard of
worth or value or propriety”748:
740 See infra notes 741–86 and accompanying text.
741 See Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 148–50.
742 Id. at 151.
743 See id.
744 See id.
745 Id. at 151.
746 See id. at 151–56.
747 See id. at 158–59.
748 Id. at 152.
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The policy of Congress has been clear. It has been to encourage the
distribution of periodicals which disseminated “information of
a public character” or which were devoted to “literature, the sci-
ences, arts, or some special industry,” because it was thought that
those publications as a class contributed to the public good. . .
[T]he experience of the post office has shown the impossibility of
making a satisfactory test based upon literary or educational values.
To attempt to do so would be to set up a censorship of the press.749
Any other reading of the statute, Douglas asserted, would violate freedom of
speech and the nation’s democratic traditions: “The provisions of the Fourth condi-
tion would have to be far more explicit for us to assume that Congress made such a
radical departure from our traditions and undertook to clothe the Postmaster General
with the power to supervise the tastes of the reading public of the country.”750
Douglas then turned to the constitutional question.751 “[G]rave constitutional
questions are immediately raised once it is said that the use of the mails is a privilege
which may be extended or withheld on any grounds whatsoever,” Douglas wrote,
referencing Brandeis’s dissent in Milwaukee Leader.752 The Postmaster General’s
power to classify the mail, he implied, was to some degree limited by the First Amend-
ment.753 Douglas went on to suggest, offhandedly, that it would be unconstitutional
for the Postmaster General to deny second-class rates to a publication on the basis
of constitutionally protected speech: speech dealing with “economic or political
ideas.”754 Holmes and Brandeis had seemingly been vindicated.
But Douglas did not expand on this intriguing assertion. He conceded that there
were certain kinds of material that could be legitimately kept out of the second-class
mail without running afoul of the First Amendment.755 Douglas suggested that second-
class privileges could be denied to nonmailable material, including obscene material.756
He declined to address whether the denial of the second-class permit to future issues
of publications based on past determinations of nonmailability would constitute a
prior restraint, as Holmes and Brandeis had argued. Douglas implied that such
restrictions, especially on obscene material, were not constitutionally proscribed.757
749 Id. at 154–55.
750 Id. at 156.
751 See id.
752 Id.
753 See id. (commenting that the Postmaster General does not retain “the power to super-
vise the tastes of the reading public of the country”).
754 Id.
755 See id. at 158.
756 See id. (“The validity of the obscenity laws is recognition that the mails may not be used
to satisfy all tastes, no matter how perverted.”).
757 Obscenity fell outside the scope of protected speech. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. at 568, 573–74 (1942).
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This statement was a disappointment to those who hoped for a ruling that would
stake out more expansive First Amendment terrain.
But then Douglas went on, in dicta, to make some of the most sweeping pronounce-
ments about the scope of freedom of speech that had ever been uttered on the Court:
Under our system of government there is an accommodation for
the widest varieties of tastes and ideas. What is good literature,
what has educational value, what is refined public information,
what is good art, varies with individuals as it does from one
generation to another. There doubtless would be a contrariety of
views concerning Cervantes’ Don Quixote, Shakespeare’s Venus
and Adonis, or Zola’s Nana.758
This paragraph is groundbreaking on many levels. Though not explicitly couched
in terms of the First Amendment, it strongly implies that constitutional protections of
free speech extend beyond the traditional domains of politics and religious expression
to art, creative expression, and culture. Douglas suggested that not only news and
public information, but literature and entertainment are within the scope of protected
speech.759 This was the first time the Court had ever broached, albeit indirectly, First
Amendment protections for “nonpolitical” speech.760 The First Amendment protected
the expression not only of a wide variety of political and religious views, Douglas
implied, but also contrarian views on issues of morality, taste, and culture.761 The
government had no more business telling people what entertainment they should
enjoy and consume than it did compelling people to adhere to particular political or
religious ideologies. Our “system of government” did not permit authorities to set
and enforce standards of good taste or cultural refinement, Douglas wrote.762 That
choice was instead for the people.763
Douglas continued:
[A] requirement that literature or art conform to some norm pre-
scribed by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our sys-
tem. The basic values implicit in the requirements of the Fourth
condition can be served only by uncensored distribution of
literature. From the multitude of competing offerings the public
will pick and choose. What seems to one to be trash may have
for others fleeting or even enduring values. But to withdraw the
758 Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 157–58.
759 See id.
760 See id.
761 See id.
762 Id. at 157.
763 See id. at 158.
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second-class rate from this publication today because its con-
tents seemed to one official not good for the public would sanc-
tion withdrawal of the second-class rate tomorrow from another
periodical whose social or economic views seemed harmful to
another official.764
Again, Douglas implies, the freedom of choice that characterizes democratic soci-
eties goes beyond such weighty matters as the ability to decide whether or not to pledge
allegiance to the flag. It includes the right to make choices about cultural preferences,
including whether or not to look at a pin-up magazine. Freedom of speech and press
protects the circulation of ideas and the public’s access to a broad range of ideas. It pro-
tects the ability of citizens not only to decide for themselves what they will consume,
but to have access to a “multitude of competing offerings,” so that they may make
the broadest and freest choices.765 It is the individual’s prerogative to pick and choose,
not the picking and choosing of censoring authorities, that the Constitution protects.
Discrimination in cultural consumption is not the job of officials but the right of the
individual citizen, acting in concert with his or her own, non-coerced taste, judg-
ment, and morals.
The passage is an extraordinary endorsement of autonomy in the expression and
consumption of ideas as a democratic value, and potentially a First Amendment
value. It celebrates respect for alternative cultural preferences and moral viewpoints
as part of the “American way of life.” America’s tradition of tolerance extends beyond
tolerance of “social or economic” views, according to Douglas.766 The official con-
demnation of material as “trash,” and off-limits to public consumption, was contrary
to the nation’s commitment to value pluralism and freedom of thought and choice.767
In the passage’s most expansive reading, Douglas seems to suggest that morality and
taste are not appropriate matters for government regulation. This implication—that
censorship of culture on moral grounds is contrary to the American tradition and
possibly unconstitutional—contained radical potential.
Douglas’s opinion in Hannegan v. Esquire, clearly influenced by the wartime con-
text,768 made an important addition to the Court’s free expression jurisprudence. It
not only alluded to the possibility of new forms of speech and subject matter as being
within the First Amendment, but suggested new interests protected by freedom of
expression: not only the right to speak but the freedom to consume both information
764 Id.
765 Id.
766 Id.
767 See id. (“What seems to one to be trash may have for others fleeting or even enduring
values.”).
768 See Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 975
(1968) (noting that during war “the constitutional guarantee of free and open discussion is put
to its most severe test”).
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and entertainment, and to make choices about that consumption in the broadest pos-
sible “marketplace” of ideas.769 With his praise for the “uncensored distribution of
literature,”770 and his implication that officials could not proscribe nonobscene material,
no matter how trashy,771 Douglas invited the Court to address, and ultimately strike
down, other forms of cultural censorship. The Esquire opinion pointed toward new
aspirations in free speech law that would be realized in the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in the subsequent two decades.772
D. “A Blow Against Dictatorship and for Free Speech”
Hannegan v. Esquire technically made no new law. It did not overturn Milwaukee
Leader and the privilege doctrine. As Zechariah Chafee noted, Hannegan v. Esquire
left the law exactly as it was after Milwaukee Leader.773 “Of all the free speech cases
where Holmes and Brandeis dissented,” Milwaukee Leader was the only one that the
Court had not “overruled or judicially discredited.”774 Hannegan said nothing con-
clusive about the Post Office Department’s authority to revoke the second-class
privileges of magazines that produced two or three consecutive issues that were
clearly nonmailable on the grounds of obscenity.775 There was nothing in the opinion
suggesting that an attempt to withdraw the second-class rate entirely from non-
mailable material would meet with any constitutional objections.776 It did not broach
the issue of whether the second-class mail rate was a privilege or a right.777 The only
clear rule to come out of the case was that the Fourth condition of the Classification
Act did not allow the Postmaster General to deny second-class rates to mailable
periodicals on the grounds of lack of contribution to the social good.778
Yet the Court did recognize the important legal status of a permit to mail at
second-class rate. And although it declined to elaborate on the extent of the Constitu-
tion’s limitations on the postal power, it did make clear that the postal power was
769 See supra notes 758, 764 and accompanying text.
770 Hannegan, 327 U.S. at 158.
771 See id.
772 See cases cited infra note 801.
773 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra note 17, at 304.
774 Id.
775 See generally 327 U.S. 146.
776 See generally id.
777 See generally id.
778 Id. at 158–59. Justice Felix Frankfurter, one of the most conservative members of the
Court, who espoused a philosophy of judicial restraint, and who was openly antagonistic toward
the “preferred position” doctrine, concurred in a separate opinion. Id. at 159–60 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring). Frankfurter wrote separately to emphasize that the ruling did not overturn
Milwaukee Leader. Id. at 160. Frankfurter warned the Court that given the important issues
at stake—the “huge subsidies” implicated in the second-class privilege—it might well be called
on in the future to address the privilege doctrine head-on. Id. At some point, the Court could no
longer escape the task of having to develop sound principles on which to determine “the basis
on which the Government may grant or withhold subsidies through low postal rates.” Id.
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not free from First Amendment restrictions.779 The most important consequence of
Hannegan v. Esquire for freedom of expression was not what it held so much as
where it pointed. The free speech principles and commitments Douglas delineated
set up inevitable future confrontations with different kinds of censorship, and the
Court’s subsequent rejection of government controls over the content of non-obscene
entertainment, art, and culture. There was also tremendous symbolic import to the
Esquire opinion. When the Court speaks on behalf of a principle—and especially in a
strong, unanimous voice—it powerfully validates that principle in the public’s mind.
Hannegan v. Esquire lent the Court’s imprimatur to tolerance, antiauthoritarianism,
autonomy, and value pluralism as American ideals, seemingly vindicating the princi-
ples for which the war had been fought.
The public and the press celebrated the decision. Newspapers reported it on front
pages, and many ran triumphant editorials praising Douglas’s opinion.780 Commenta-
tors put the Esquire decision in the line of foundational modern freedom of the press
cases starting with Near v. Minnesota. “Freedom of the Press Again Upheld in the
Supreme Court” announced one headline.781 “[The Esquire decision] indicates that
the Supreme Court . . . still has a pretty sound concept of ‘freedom of the press.’”782
The decision affirmed that when it came to the rights of the press, “the . . . Supreme
Court is a reassuring institution.”783
Several commentators linked the decision to the outcome of the war.784 Esquire’s
publisher David Smart told reporters that the decision was “a blow against dictator-
ship and for free speech.”785 “A vital, traditional principle has been upheld by the
Supreme Court,” wrote one editorial.786 “Demagoguery received a neat punch in the
nose.”787 “[T]hanks to the U.S. Supreme Court, [America] is still a country where you
can still look over Varga girls, Republicans, Socialists—and yes even Democrats,
too—and decide for yourself what’s fit.”788 The Los Angeles Times rejoiced that “the
crafty forces of censorship have been decisively defeated on one more front.”789
779 See id. at 158–59.
780 See, e.g., Editorial, Court Against ‘Censorship’, ITHACA J. (New York), Feb. 8, 1946,
at 6; Protection of Liberties, ESCABANA DAILY PRESS (Michigan), Feb. 6, 1946, at 4.
781 Freedom of the Press in the United States, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Utah), Feb. 11, 1946,
at 4.
782 Public Is the Real Censor, EUGENE GUARD (Oregon), Feb. 7, 1946, at 8.
783 And That’s That, VIDETTE MESSENGER (Indiana), Feb. 7, 1946, at 4.
784 See, e.g., Supreme Court Removes a Censorship, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1946, at 16 (“[T]he
crafty forces of censorship have been decisively defeated on one more front.”).
785 2d Class Mail Bar on Esquire Voided by Court, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Missouri),
Feb. 4, 1946, at 7.
786 Court Against ‘Censorship’, supra note 780, at 6.
787 Protection of Liberties, supra note 780, at 4.
788 This or That, EAU CLAIRE LEADER (Wisconsin), Feb. 7, 1946, at 10.
789 Supreme Court Removes a Censorship, supra note 784, at 16.
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E. Aftermath
Despite the limited holding in Hannegan v. Esquire, the decision had a direct and
immediate impact on Post Office Department practice. Esquire was the first and last
time the Post Office Department attempted to use the Fourth condition as a “merit
badge” for publications.790 After Hannegan v. Esquire, the Post Office Department
also cut back on denials of second-class permits even to nonmailable material.791 In
the late 1940s, Roger Baldwin of the ACLU interviewed the Solicitor of the Post
Office Department, who declared that second-class permits were no longer revoked
when “a publisher put out a single ‘non-mailable’ issue or widely intermittent, non-
mailable issues.”792 By the 1950s, the Post Office Department had virtually stopped
the practice of denying second-class permits as an anti-obscenity sanction.793
The seeds Douglas planted in Hannegan v. Esquire, suggesting a broader scope
for constitutionally protected speech, bore fruit within a year of the decision. The
notion that the First Amendment protects nonpolitical speech, including popular
culture, was mobilized by the Court in cases in the 1940s and 1950s invalidating gov-
ernment restrictions on literature and film.794 In Winters v. New York,795 a majority
struck down, on First Amendment grounds, a New York law criminalizing the pub-
lication of material containing descriptions of “bloodshed, lust [and] crime.”796 The
law had been applied against the seller of a pulp magazine called Headquarters
Detective. Rejecting the state’s contention that freedom of the press did not apply
to entertainment, the opinion by Justice Reed relied on Hannegan v. Esquire:
We do not accede to appellee’s suggestion that the constitutional
protection for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas.
The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elu-
sive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is familiar
with instances of propaganda through fiction. What is one man’s
amusement, teaches another’s doctrine. Though we can see
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they
are as much entitled to the protection of free speech as the best
of literature.797
790 Robertus, supra note 114, at 15, 38–39.
791 See id. at 39 (“Since Esquire, the revocation power has been seldom used.”).
792 PAUL & SCHWARTZ, supra note 84, at 76–77.
793 See id. at 77.
794 Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (striking down state censorship of film);
Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (protecting pulp magazines).
795 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
796 Id. at 508, 520.
797 Id. at 510.
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Since Winters was a First Amendment holding (Esquire was reversed on statutory
grounds),798 this passage by Justice Reed, rather than Douglas’s statements in Hannegan
v. Esquire, came to stand for the proposition that the First Amendment protects
popular culture and entertainment, no less than informational publications, against
content-based restrictions, and that proscriptions on nonobscene speech on the basis
of purported lack of social value ran afoul of constitutional guarantees of free
expression. Winters was subsequently mobilized in Burstyn v. Wilson,799 in which
a unanimous Court struck down New York’s film censorship law on First Amend-
ment grounds.800 In the next two decades, Winters and Hannegan were cited by state
and federal courts in decisions that rejected content-based restrictions of film, art,
and literature.801 In suggesting new interests and forms of expression shielded by con-
stitutional speech protections, Hannegan v. Esquire had set in motion a vision of the
First Amendment as a broader charter of freedom.
Regarded as the most important freedom of the press case of its time, the Esquire
case has been overlooked by legal historians. It has been the purpose of this Article
to restore the case to the significant position it deserves. Coterminous with America’s
involvement in the Second World War, “the Esquire Affair” became an opportunity
for the nation to collectively express and affirm its commitment to freedom of
expression and to anti-censorship ideals. Through the discussion and dialogue that
swirled around the case, Americans condemned arbitrary government controls over
speech and publishing as antithetical to the “American way of life.” The public and
the Supreme Court affirmed the freedom to speak, to read, and to “pick and choose”—
even in such areas of life as the consumption of popular culture and entertain-
ment—as core principles of democratic societies, important values for which the war
had been fought. The Esquire saga contributed to the expansion of the First Amend-
ment’s protections and to the continued liberalization of popular attitudes toward
free expression after the war—to the flourishing, in postwar America, of a modern
“free-speech society.”802
798 Id. at 509–10. See also CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS, supra
note 17, at 301.
799 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
800 Id. at 506.
801 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 147 (1959); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 901, 960 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); New American Library of World Literature v. Allen, 114 F. Supp.
823, 829 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Gill v. Hearst, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (Cal. 1953); People v. Richmond
County News, Inc., 175 N.E. 2d 681, 683 (N.Y. 1961); Molony v. Boy Comics Pub’s, 277 A.D.
166, 167 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
802 Donald Downs, Government Censorship Since 1945, in 5 A HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN
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